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GRADING THE REPORT CARD: AN INVESTIGATION OF CONSUMER-DIRECTED 
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AS THE BASIS OF QUALITY ASSURANCE SYSTEMS IN 
HEALTH CARE REFORM. 
Jason Ross Penzer (Sponsored by Angela Holder). Department of 
Pediatrics, Yale University, School of Medicine, New Haven, CT. 
Abstract 
This thesis investigates the hypothesis that consumer-directed 
quality information dissemination, in the form of health care 
report cards, is practically, technically, and theoretically 
inappropriate as the foundation of quality assurance systems in 
health care reform. The investigator examines the emergence of 
consumer-directed information disclosure proposals in the public 
health care reform debate and in the private sector. By drawing on 
the literatures of cognitive psychology, marketing, existing 
statutory information disclosure, and case studies of current 
report card efforts, the author reveals the pitfalls of relying on 
health care report cards as a quality assurance system. The 
research supports the hypothesis and the investigator concludes 
that despite their rising popularity in legislative reform and the 
private sector, report cards cannot currently assure quality, given 
limitations in the state of the art of quality measurement and 




The overriding hypothesis of this thesis, which is 
ultimately supported by the research, is that consumer- 
directed quality information dissemination, in the form of 
health care report cards, is practically, technically, and 
theoretically inappropriate as the foundation of quality 
assurance systems in health care reform. In organizing the 
discussion explaining the acceptance of the overall 
hypothesis, the investigator addresses six sequential working 
hypotheses. These state: 
1. That report card systems are the cornerstones of recent 
federal and state legislative/regulatory initiatives and 
private sector efforts to reform quality assurance programs in 
health care. 
2. That technological limitations make the implementation of 
report card systems problematic in the short term. 
3 . That report card-based quality assurance systems entail 
significant direct and hidden costs to health care providers 
and health care institutions that undermine their efficacy. 
4. That evidence from the disciplines of cognitive psychology 
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and marketing shows that even well constructed, technically 
sound health care report cards would yield fatally flawed 
quality assurance systems. 
5. That severe knowledge deficits regarding the useful content 
of health care report cards and confusion between ensuring 
consumer satisfaction and measuring quality renders them 
inappropriate as quality assurance tools at this time. 
6. That recent experience with consumer-directed technical 
information dissemination programs in consumer credit and food 
nutrition labeling supports the conclusions of hypotheses 1-5. 
The acceptance of these six sub-hypotheses is the basis for 
the acceptance of the main hypothesis of this thesis, that 
consumer directed quality information dissemination, in the 
form of health care report cards, is practically, technically, 
and theoretically inappropriate as the foundation of quality 
assurance systems in health care reform. 
Methods 
The investigator examined an extensive number of primary 
and secondary sources in the course of this research, all of 
which are footnoted specifically throughout the discussion 
sections of the paper. The primary sources included the text 
of numerous federal and state legislative bills, agency 
• 
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regulations, official commentaries, legislative debates, 
testimony before congressional committees, and critical 
commentary in the mainstream and specialty presses. Research 
into private sector report card programs involved analysis of 
internal corporate documents, balance sheets and financial 
statements for both managed care companies and individual 
hospitals, review of existing private report card programs, 
and examination of statements by corporate officers, hospital 
network executives, and individual providers involved with 
report card systems. Research into the technical obstacles to 
an effective report card system also involved extensive 
investigation of the state of the art in health care quality 
measurement, including review of recent efforts in outcomes 
measurement, clinical information systems, patient surveys, 
expert quality review, and computerized health care databases. 
A case study in state level report card programs, culled from 
extensive primary source research into the Pennsylvania Health 
Care Cost Containment Council activities, yielded valuable 
data on the bureaucratic, financial, and technical pitfalls of 
current report card efforts. Research in the literatures of 
cognitive psychology and marketing shed necessary light on the 
basic flaws in the underlying theory of consumer-directed 
information disclosure as a quality assurance tool, especially 
in light of the information gaps in health care quality 
measurement and information inequalities between providers and 
consumers. Relying on the same classical economic theory that 
' 
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proponents of consumer-directed information disclosure use to 
support report cards, the investigator reveals the disparity 
between assuring consumer satisfaction and assuring quality in 
health care. 
Research into two analogous information dissemination 
efforts, in consumer credit and nutrition labeling, yields 
experiential data supporting the working hypotheses formulated 
for health care report cards and lends credence to the 
investigator's suggestions regarding the future of current 
report card efforts. 
Given that the questions investigated during the course 
of this research pertain primarily to policy issues in health 
care reform, the thesis concludes with policy recommendations 
based on acceptance of the hypothesis that report card 




Any investigation of policy questions in health care 
reform occurs in an environment of rapid change. Over the 
course of several years, months, and even days, political 
leaders change, agendas shift to accommodate new political 
realities and business climates, and yesterday's seminal idea 
becomes today's most recently discarded folly. In pursuing a 
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project of extended research in health care then, the 
investigator is faced with two particular dangers: first, that 
events will render the hypothesis itself moot, and second, 
that even his latest research will fail to incorporate today's 
latest developments. 
Admittedly, this thesis presents a snapshot — albeit a 
carefully detailed and focussed one — of a rapidly evolving 
picture. Political circumstance has largely defined the 
temporal borders of that snapshot. The months leading up to 
the introduction of the Clinton Health Security Act in late 
1993 thrust report card systems squarely into the public 
spotlight; state level and especially private sector 
initiatives have subsequently taken up the report card banner 
left floating in the wake of the Clinton plan's defeat. As 
the discussion below explains, this project clearly avoids the 
danger that changing circumstances have mooted the hypothesis. 
Even though the second danger — that important quality 
assurance initiatives and data are emerging with each passing 
day — is to some extent unavoidable, this thesis strives to be 
as current as deadlines allow and to identify areas where 
emerging data will impact the policy debate. A natural 
starting point then is the original emergence of report card 
proposals onto center stage in 1993. 
After months of intense research by Hillary Rodham 
Clinton's semi-secret Task Force and political maneuvering by 
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the White House, President Bill Clinton announced his plan to 
reform the nation's health care system on Wednesday evening, 
September 22, 1993. In a televised address to the joint 
Houses of Congress, he proclaimed "a new chapter in the 
American story."1 The President staked his plan on six "fixed 
stars": security, simplicity, savings, choice, quality, and 
responsibility. In describing the fifth star, quality, 
Clinton proposed to harness the opportunities of the 
"information age" and create "report cards" on health plans so 
that consumers could compare competing plans and reward high 
quality providers by selecting their plans.2 
The report card proposal has outlived the Clinton Plan 
itself. The proposal's inclusion in subsequent reform agendas 
and its place at center stage in state level and private 
quality assurance programs demonstrate the powerful appeal 
report cards now have in health care delivery. Although the 
President and Congress eventually disagreed on the plot and 
ending of Clinton's "new chapter," the health care reform 
debate in the 103d Congress set the stage for a major movement 
in health care quality assurance. While Congress continues to 
consider reform bills that include report card systems and 
Medicaid/Medicare reform that encourages private sector 
1 Adam Clymer, Clinton's Health Plan: The Overview, 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1993, at A1. 
: Clinton's Health Plan: Transcript of President's 




managed care and delegates responsibility to the states, both 
states and the private sector have already adopted consumer- 
directed quality information disclosure as the mantra of 
modern quality assurance. 
This discussion section is divided into three parts, each 
of which addresses specific working hypotheses of this thesis. 
Part I examines Title V of Clinton's Health Security Act, 
subsequent reform bills, and private sector programs to 
determine what substance, if any, the proposed legislation and 
private actors give to the report card and what role different 
institutions in the health care system would play in its 
development. This section reveals that policymakers describe 
the concept of a consumer-directed information disclosure 
program, but not its substance. In fact, this section reveals 
that the private sector — composed largely of corporate 
employers, for-profit managed care companies, and private 
hospital networks — as the current driving force behind report 
card systems, is engaged in a chaotic, fragmented, unmonitored 
series of working experiments with various data measurement 
and reporting systems in an effort to dominate an emerging 
quality assessment industry. This section supports the 
hypothesis: 1) that report card systems are the cornerstones 
of recent federal and state legislative/regulatory initiatives 
and private sector efforts to reform quality assurance 
programs in health care. 
Part II of the discussion section supports the working 
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hypothesis: 2) that technological limitations make the 
implementation of report card systems problematic in the short 
term; and 3) that report card based quality assurance systems 
entail significant direct and hidden costs to health care 
providers and health care institutions that undermine their 
efficacy. It describes the state of the art in health care 
quality measurement and current efforts to promote quality and 
control costs through consumer education. This discussion 
demonstrates that the limited science and prohibitive cost of 
quality measurement undermine the efficacy of a national 
report card proposal. 
Part III supports the final three working hypotheses: 4) 
that evidence from the disciplines of cognitive psychology and 
marketing shows that even well constructed, technically sound 
health care report cards would yield fatally flawed quality 
assurance systems; 5) that severe knowledge deficits regarding 
the useful content of health care report cards and confusion 
between ensuring consumer satisfaction and measuring quality 
renders them inappropriate as quality assurance tools at this 
time; and 6) that recent experience with consumer-directed 
technical information dissemination programs in consumer 
credit and food nutrition labeling supports the acceptance of 
hypotheses 1-5. This section reviews data from the literatures 
of cognitive psychology, marketing, and researches the laws 
requiring information disclosure in order to develop an 
understanding of consumer information processing in health 
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care and other regulatory contexts. This section then 
explores in detail two existing efforts to improve quality, 
empower consumers, and modify consumer and industry behavior 
through information strategies: nutrition labeling under the 
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA)* * 3 and credit cost 
term disclosure under the Truth In Lending Act (TILA)4 and the 
Truth In Lending Simplification and Reform Act (TILSRA).5 
Ultimately, the uncertainty of consumer response to 
information disclosure proves that report cards are not a 
reliable quality assurance mechanism. The acceptance of the 
six working hypotheses reveals that report cards are 
practically, technically, and theoretically inappropriate as 
the foundations of quality assurance systems in health care 
reform. 
I. Competition, Consumer Satisfaction, and Quality Control 
in Health Care Reform Legislation: The Report Card 
Six weeks after President Clinton first announced his 
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, Pub. L. No. 
101-535, 104 Stat 2353 (Nov. 8, 1990) (codified at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 343-1 and in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 21 U.S.C. § 
301 gives the legislative genealogy and short title for the 
NLEA. 
4 Truth In Lending Act, Pub. L. 90-321, § 101, 82 
Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1601) 
(enacted as Title I of Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. 
90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.)). 
Truth In Lending Simplification and Reform Act of 
1980, Pub. L. 96-221, 94 Stat. 168 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 1601 (1993)) . 
■ 
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intention to overhaul the health care system, the 
Administration ceremoniously "relaunched" its plan with the 
public release of the 1,342 page bill on October 27, 1993.6 
On Saturday evening, November 20, the bill was formally 
presented to the House and Senate with considerably less 
fanfare, signalling the beginning of a grueling legislative 
battle. Former House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt 
introduced the Health Security Act (HSA) as H.R. 3600 with 
ninety-nine cosponsors, and Former Senate Majority Leader 
George Mitchell did likewise for S. 1757 along with thirty 
fellow senators.7 
The subsequent rise and fall of health care reform in the 
103d Congress has been an oft told tale. For the purposes of 
this discussion, it need only be noted that after its much 
celebrated introduction, the Clinton bill rapidly lost 
momentum, and several important competing plans emerged in 
Congress. Legislators failed to reach consensus on any of 
these proposals, and by September 26, 1994, Senator Mitchell 
declared health care reform dead for the year. The 
Administration and influential members of Congress quickly 
Timothy J. McNulty, The Clintons' 1,342-Page 
Prescription, Chi. Trib . , Oct. 28, 1993, at N1. 
The Health Security Act appears as H.R. 3600, 103d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), and as S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1993) [hereinafter cited to original sections of the Health 
Security Act (HSA)]. See also 139 Cong. Rec. E2989 (daily ed. 
Nov. 21, 1993) (extension of remarks by Rep. Gephardt, 
introducing H.R. 3600); 139 Cong. Rec. S16787 (daily ed. Nov. 
20, 1993) (statement of Sen. Mitchell, introducing S. 1757). 
1 
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vowed to reintroduce new legislation in the 104th Congress. 
The focus of the Republican 104th Congress in health care has 
largely involved proposed reform of the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs. As part of the emphasis on cost cutting from these 
programs, the 104th Congress has endorsed the enrollment of 
program beneficiaries into private managed care systems. 
Although the momentum of this transition to privately 
administered managed care has stalled with the 1996 budget 
impasse, the delegation of responsibility for managing health 
care and with it quality assurance to the private sector is a 
fait accompli. 
The demise of the Clinton plan does not undermine the 
importance of assessing report card proposals. As even a 
brief survey of major alternative reform plans and private 
sector initiatives reveals, report cards are part of the 
agenda. Whatever legislative reform ultimately emerges will 
almost certainly, and uncritically, sanction and expand report 
card use. Moreover, state governments and regulatory agencies 
at all levels have taken the signal from the Clinton plan 
debates and subsequent calls for managed care. Report card 
programs are already centerpieces of state-level health reform 
and regulatory experimentation. Finally, the private sector 
has enthusiastically seized on the report cards' promise of 
increased price competition, quality monitoring, and consumer 
empowerment. In their rush to develop report cards, private 
accreditation agencies, health plans, and major corporations 
- 
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have created, virtually overnight, a vast information¬ 
processing and distribution industry for health care 
provision. 
A. The Clinton Plan 
While many of the bureaucratic structures described in 
the Clinton plan have been discarded, careful analysis of the 
original Clinton bill provides not only a blueprint of a 
prototypical legislative report card system and a glimpse at 
the theory behind report card-based quality assurance, but 
also a greater understanding of the goals that policymakers at 
all levels expect to achieve with report cards. Consumer- 
directed information disclosure played a central role in the 
Administration's efforts to create a quality improvement 
program and control costs; informed, comparison-shopping 
consumers were expected to spur price and quality competition 
among plans. Among the six explicitly enumerated purposes of 
the HSA, four related directly to the quality reporting 
system: "to simplify the health care system for consumers," 
"to control the cost of health care," "to promote individual 
choice among health plans and health care providers," and "to 
ensure high quality health care."8 
Title V of the HSA addressed quality and consumer 
protection. Sections 5001-5002 create a National Quality 
8 Health Security Act, supra note 7, § 3. 
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Management Program under the seven member National Health 
Board. A fifteen member National Quality Management Council 
would have administered the program.9 Both National Health 
Board and National Quality Management Council members were to 
be appointed directly by the President, National Health Board 
members being selected on the basis of their experience and 
expertise in the fields of medicine, health care financing and 
delivery, state health systems, consumer protection, business, 
law, and delivery of care to vulnerable populations.10 
National Quality Management Council members would include 
representatives from corporate purchasers of health care, 
health plans, the States, health care providers, academic 
health centers, and experts in public health, health care 
quality, and health services research.* 11 
Although the HSA established an impressive administrative 
structure to support the National Quality Management Program, 
it gave the National Health Board almost no guidance as to the 
content of the program itself. The statute required that the 
National Quality Management Program be "designed to enhance 
the quality, appropriateness, and effectiveness of health care 
services and access to such services."12 To that end, 
HSA §§ 5001-5002. HSA § 1501 creates the National 
Health Board. 
10 HSA § 1502. 
11 HSA § 5002. 
12 HSA § 5001. 
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section 5003 instructed the National Quality Management 
Council to develop a "set of national measures of quality 
performance, which shall be used to assess the provision of 
health care services and access to such services." In 
consultation with the states, health plans, employers, 
individual consumers, providers, the newly formed National 
Quality Consortium, experts in law, medicine, economics, 
public health, and health services research, the administrator 
for Health Care Policy and Research, the Director of the 
National Institute of Health, and the Administrator of the 
Health Care Financing Administration, the Council was 
instructed to select measures providing information on six 
subjects: access to health care services, appropriateness of 
services provided, outcomes of health care services and 
procedures, health promotion, prevention of diseases, and 
consumer satisfaction. Measures of quality performance were 
to be selected on the basis of significance (in terms of the 
"prevalence, morbidity, mortality, or . . . costs" associated 
with the prevention, diagnosis, treatment, or clinical 
management of the disease), reliability and validity, 
variation among providers, linkage to health outcomes under 
provider control, and relation to public health goals. In 
addition, section 5003 stipulated that the set of measures 
chosen was to be representative of the range of services 
provided to consumers of health care and based on data 
"obtain[able] without undue burden on the entity or individual 
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providing the data." The Council was instructed to annually 
update the national quality-performance measures.13 In areas 
where sufficient information and consensus were found to 
exist, the National Quality Management Council was instructed 
to recommend that the National Health Board establish 
performance goals for health plans and providers.14 
Consumer surveys played an important role in the HSA's 
information gathering efforts. Section 5004 instructed the 
National Quality Management Council to conduct periodic 
surveys of consumers to gather data on access, use of 
services, health outcomes, and patient satisfaction. The 
surveys were to be standardized and administered by the 
Administrator of the federal Agency for Health Care Policy and 
Research on a plan-by-plan basis.15 
The HSA created additional bureaucratic players in the 
quality improvement program: Regional Professional 
Foundations, alliances, and a National Quality Consortium. 
The National Health Board was to appoint eleven members to the 
Consortium, five representing academic health centers, and the 
other six representing schools of public health, medical 
schools, nursing schools, and allied health professional 
schools.16 In addition to advising the National Quality 
13 HSA § 5003. 
14 HSA § 5005. 
15 HSA § 5004. 




Management Council on the selection of national quality 
measures, the Consortium was to oversee the establishment of 
the Regional Professional Foundations. The latter were then 
to develop "innovative patient education systems that enhance 
patient involvement in decisions relating [to] their health 
care."17 The alliances were to "disseminate to consumers 
information relating to quality and access to aid in their 
selection of plans" and conduct educational programs to 
"assist consumers in using quality and other information in 
choosing health plans."18 
Under section 5013, the legal and financial burden of 
measuring and producing the data required by the new federal 
bureaucracy, the States, and the individual alliances would 
have fallen on individual health plans. These plans were 
required to maintain quality management systems that used the 
national measures of quality performance and "measure[d] the 
quality of health care furnished to enrollees under the plan 
by all health care providers who are members of a provider 
network of the plan."19 
To facilitate data collection, the HSA proposed the 
creation of a massive data bank and electronic health 
information system within two years of the Act's passage.20 
17 HSA § 5008. 
18 HSA § 5012. 
19 HSA § 5013. 
20 HSA §§ 5101-5106. 
' 
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This unprecedented national health information system would 
have combined cost, enrollment, demographic, utilization 
review, quality, grievance, and financial data with any other 
type of information deemed appropriate by the National Health 
Board. This effort would have dwarfed the only other national 
data bank in the health care sector, the of t-criticized 
National Practitioners Databank, created in 1986 by the Health 
Care Quality Improvement Act.21 
Once this extensive array of individual, institutional, 
and bureaucratic actors had defined national quality measures 
and collected relevant data, a herculean feat in itself, there 
would have remained the more significant task of using that 
data to promote quality care, provider and consumer education, 
and cost control.22 Public education under the HSA would 
21 Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 11101-52 (Supp. 1993). See Elisabeth Ryzen, The 
National Practitioner Databank: Problems and Proposed 
Reforms, 13 J. Legal Med. 409 (1992) (arguing that data bank 
gathers erroneous and marginally relevant information, 
inadequately safeguards confidentiality, and costs more than 
its benefits justify; also recommending that amendments 
expanding its scope should be repealed, only extremes of 
malpractice payments in number and amount should be reported 
to strengthen the link incompetence to settlements and awards, 
reporting criteria for resident physicians should be 
restricted, and data bank should be purged every five years); 
Susan L. Horner, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 
1986: Its History, Provisions, Applications and Implications, 
16 Am. J. Law & Med .455(1990). 
22 This thesis focuses only on the quantity, type, and 
content of the information directed towards health care 
consumers and on how consumers process and act upon that 
information. Similar issues and questions could be raised for 
providers, health care institutions such as hospitals or 
nursing homes, academic health centers, and health plans. 
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have proceeded at two levels: one aimed at consumers, the 
other at patients. The first level, termed here the "point of 
insurance" choice, would have involved educating consumers 
about the options faced when selecting a health plan each 
year. An individual consumer at this level might or might not 
have been a "patient," that is, a party already involved with 
the health care system on a regular basis due to an ongoing 
illness or condition. The second level, termed the "point of 
treatment" choice, would have involved educating "patients" 
about specific diseases, conditions, and treatment options 
that they might encounter at specific times in their medical 
histories. 
There would have been two principal outlets for all the 
information collected by the National Health Board and 
National Quality Management Council: performance reports 
(report cards)23 and practice guidelines.24 Performance 
reports would have addressed yearly point of insurance 
choices. Practice guidelines, directed towards consumers as 
well as providers, would have addressed the point of treatment 
choices.25 While the creation, dissemination, and 
23 HSA, supra note 7, §§ 1325, 5005, 5012. 
24 HSA § 5006. 
Practice guidelines are available from the 
Department of Health and Human Service's Agency for Health 
Care Policy Research (AHCPR) for a number of conditions. 
Simplified versions are published for patients, while detailed 
guidelines are provided to physicians. See AHCPR, U.S. Dep't of 
Health and Human Services, Practice Guideline No. 8, Benign Prostatic 
Hyperplasia: Diagnosis and Treatment (1994) and AHCPR, U.S. Dep't of 
_ 
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application of practice guidelines were fundamental to the 
Quality Program and deserve thorough consideration, this 
thesis focuses only on report cards.26 
The report card proposal derived from two separate 
sections of the HSA. Section 5005(c) outline the yearly 
performance reports. Alliances would: 
publish and make available to the public a 
performance report outlining in a standard format 
the performance of each health plan offered in the 
alliance on the set of national measures of quality 
performance. The report shall include the results 
of smaller numbers of such measures for health care 
providers who are members of provider networks of 
such plans ... if the available information is 
statistically meaningful. The report also shall 
include the results of consumer surveys . . . that 
were conducted in the alliance during the year that 
is the subject of the report. 
The National Quality Management Council was to compile all 
Health and Human Services, Practice Guideline No. 8, Treating Your Enlarged 
Prostate: Consumer Version (1994). 
For an enlightening piece on how providers make 
decisions based on available probabilistic information, see 
David M. Eddy, Probabilistic Reasoning in Clinical Medicine: 
Problems and Opportunities, in Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases 249 (Daniel Kahneman et al. , eds. , 1982); 
see also David M. Eddy, Variations in Physician Practice: The 
Role of Uncertainty, Health Affs . , Summer 1984, at 74 (1984); 
Barry R. Furrow, The Changing Role of the Law in Promoting 
Quality in Health Care: From Sanctioning Outlaws to Managing 
Outcomes, 26 Houston L. Rev. 147, 164-66 (1989) . The same 
quality measurement data that produces practice guidelines 
could also generate plan-wide information. Current outcomes 
research, for example, can uncover wide local variation in 
procedure use that might lead to the formulation of a practice 
guideline. Once the guidelines are in place, compliance could 
become useful as a plan quality indicator, if it is risk 
adjusted. See JoAnne Alter & David Holzman, Interest in 
Outcomes Research Is Growing Rapidly, in Special Report, 
Putting Outcomes Research to Work, Bus. and Health, 8 (Joseph 
Burns ed. , 1992) [hereinafter Special Report] . 
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these reports and consumer surveys into an annual report to 
Congress on plan performance and quality trends.27 
Section 1325, entitled Consumer Information and 
Marketing, set minimum content standards for the report card. 
Alliances were to make available "information, in an easily 
understood and useful form, that allows such enrollees . . . 
to make valid comparisons among health plans offered by the 
alliance." This was to be published in an annual brochure 
that would have included, in a standardized format, 
information required by the National Health Board, including, 
at a minimum, the following: 
(A) The cost of the plan, including premiums 
and average out-of-pocket expenses. 
(B) The characteristics and availability of 
health care professionals and institutions 
participating in the plan. 
(C) Any restrictions on access to providers and 
services under the plan. 
(D) A summary of the annual quality performance 
report . . . which contains measures of quality 
presented in a standard format.28 
B. The Congressional Health Care Reform Bills 
All major reform bills introduced as alternatives to the 
Clinton plan relied on consumer-directed report cards as the 
major component of quality assurance. In this respect, 
Senator George Mitchell's bill, introduced in August 1994, was 
HSA, supra note 7, § 5005. 
28 HSA § 1325. 
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virtually identical to Clinton's.29 The bill's Title V would 
have created a National Quality Council,30 numerous Quality 
Improvement Foundations,31 and a National Center of Consumer 
Information and Advocacy.32 The National Quality Council 
would have established performance measures and goals33 to be 
used in grading health plans for consumer report cards. The 
data gathering, analysis, and compilation functions at the 
heart of the report card system could then have been 
subcontracted through competitive bidding,34 and the Consumer 
Information and Advocacy Centers would have distributed the 
finished product in each state. The Mitchell Plan's initial 
price tag for the National Quality Council, Quality 
Improvement Foundations, and Consumer Information and Advocacy 
Centers was more than $2.4 billion over six years; all but $24 
million would have been available to subcontractors.35 
29 S. 2357, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) [hereinafter 
Mitchell Plan]. Senator Mitchell's bill was also known as the 
Health Security Act. 
30 Id. § 5001. 
31 Id. § 5008. 
32 Id. § 5009. 
33 Id. §§ 5002-5003. 
34 Id. §§ 5001(o), 5004(b), 5008(b) (establishing a 
subcontracting option for the creation of the Quality 
Improvement Foundations). 
Id. § 5010. The appropriations breakdown for 1995- 
2000 is as follows: $24 million for the national Quality 
Council, $1.2 billion for the Quality Improvement Foundations, 




Another major reform proposal, introduced late in the debate 
by a bipartisan group of moderate Senators as an amendment to 
the Mitchell Plan, would have left Title V and the report card 
proposal intact.36 
Report card systems have been endorsed by both parties. 
Republican Senator John Chafee's Plan, while eschewing some of 
the bureaucracy proposed in other plans, would have required 
state programs to prepare price, outcomes, satisfaction, and 
quality data for consumers.37 Senate Minority Leader Bob 
Dole's plan would have required each state to develop a 
"consumer value program" that would issue a report card 
according to guidelines established by the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services. States could have subcontracted the 
administration of these consumer value programs to private 
entities.38 The Cooper-Breaux Plan (HR 3222, S 1579) and the 
Wellstone-McDermott bill (HR 1200, S 491) also required 
dissemination of quality information and publication of 
consumer satisfaction rates. 
The so-called Mainstream Coalition plan, introduced 
by Senators Chafee(R) and Breaux(D) focused primarily on 
changes in finance and coverage. 
37 S. 1770, § 1405, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) 
[hereinafter Chafee Plan]. 
38 S. 2374, §§ 21012, 21102, 21103, 103d Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1994) [hereinafter Dole Plan]. § 21102 mentions that 
the Secretary should consult with the National Committee for 
Quality Assurance, see infra text accompanying note 43, Joint 
Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, 
see infra text accompanying note 42, and other appropriate 




Although Congress did not pass any of these specific 
bills, the reliance on report card systems as pillars of 
market reform and quality assurance now extends across the 
political spectrum. Despite the recent retreat from extensive 
federally legislated health care reform, the significance of 
this bipartisan support for report card systems should not be 
underestimated. The willingness of political leaders to 
support report card efforts has spurred states and the private 
sector to adopt consumer-directed information disclosure as 
the quality assurance program of choice. While the nuts and 
bolts of structural health care reform have shifted from the 
public to the private sectors with the continued growth of 
corporately managed care, it was broad-based support from 
political leaders and now specific incentives for managed care 
enrollment and report card programs in Medicare reform bills 
that started the engine of the report card juggernaut.39 
Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle promised that all 
Medicare reform bills would require quality report cards from 
managed care plans. Much of the proposed $270 billion in 
savings from Medicare Part A predicted by the Republican 
budget bill and the $89-124 billion in savings in the 
Democratic counter-proposal depends directly on increasing 
enrollment in private managed care plans. See Senate 
Democrats' Plan Cuts Growth by $89 billion, Sets Up 
Commission, 3 HCPR 40 dlO (October 9, 1995); Medicaid 
Differences Expected to be Tough for Clinton, Congress to 
Bridge, BNA Health Care Daily (November 27, 19 95) . The 
Republican Medicare reform was part of the initial 
Congressional seven-year balanced budget package (HR 2491) 
that President Clinton vetoed. Debate over Medicaid reform to 
date has pitted the Republican proposal to turn Medicaid into 
block grants to the states (projected savings of $163.4 
billion) versus the Democratic vow to preserve Medicaid as a 
federal/state entitlement with savings achieved through 
managed care (projected savings $83 billion). 
■ 
24 
C. Other Government Actors and the Private Sector 
Government agencies and the private sector are not 
waiting for Congress to enact comprehensive health care 
reform. Even if Congress never passes health care reform 
legislation, the report card movement is quickly becoming a 
fixture of health care cost control and quality assurance 
efforts. A number of different actors are forging ahead with 
report card systems intended to inform consumers about quality 
and price. 
At the federal level, the Agency for Health Care Policy 
and Research (AHCPR), located in the Department of Public 
Health, announced in September 1994 that it would develop a 
national report card on managed care providers that would 
combine the results of consumer surveys, medical records 
reviews, and analysis of insurance claims data.40 In 
addition, a number of state governments have already passed 
laws requiring the creation and dissemination of hospital 
Jonathan Gardner, Federal Agency Set to Grade 
Providers, Modern Healthcare, Sept. 19, 1994, at 3. It is 
interesting to note that the AHCPR itself has become a 
battleground in the budget debates of 1995-1996. In March 
1995, the House Budget Committee suggested that the budget for 
AHCPR be zeroed out over five years, while the Clinton 
Administration's package maintained funding at $193.5 million. 
In testimony before the Committee, AHCPR and HCFA executives 
maintained that AHCPR was crucial to government efforts to 
conduct research in quality assurance and the best hope to 
standardize quality data collection systems. 57 The Pink 




Private sector efforts are advancing even faster. The 
Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations (JCAHO) is trying to become a major player in 
the report card scramble. In fall of 1994, JCAHO launched an 
intensive state-level lobbying effort to encourage health 
departments and reform commissions to adopt its clinical- 
indicator monitoring and public quality data disclosure 
systems. In California, Florida, and Washington, JCAHO has 
lobbied state authorities to mandate use of its systems to 
satisfy new health care data reporting laws.42 In addition, 
JCAHO has created a new vice-presidency for government 
relations to oversee the lobbying effort. 
The private National Committee for Quality Assurance 
(NCQA), originally dedicated solely to accrediting Health 
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), is bidding to become the 
ultimate arbiter of quality data gathering, analysis, and 
distribution. NCQA is currently engaged in a report card 
pilot program with twenty major health plans, and released its 
first report on the project in February 1995. NCQA found that 
lack of data-gathering standards, incomplete data bases, lack 
of preparedness by health plans and hospitals to collect the 
41 California, Iowa, Ohio, and Florida, in addition to 
the Pennsylvania program described in Part II.B, have all 
launched or announced plans for statewide report card 
projects. See infra notes 88-104 and accompanying text. 
David Burda, JCAHO Seeks Inclusion in State Reform 
Legislation, Modern Healthcare, Sept. 12, 1994, at 17, 17-19. 
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data, the absence of risk adjustment, and confusion over which 
data interested consumers represented the biggest challenges 
for future report card efforts. The president of NCQA, while 
supporting the effort as "necessary groundwork," concluded 
that "a lot of systems building needs to be done."43 The 
Committee is also combining performance measures and consumer 
satisfaction surveys in a report card project involving Ford, 
General Motors, Chrysler, the United Auto Workers, and nine 
Michigan HMOs.44 
Corporations have invested heavily in report card 
systems. Long concerned about the cost and quality of health 
benefits offered to employees, large corporations have begun 
to forge partnerships with managed care plans to create their 
own report card systems. The New England Group, which 
includes 16 health plans and 28 employers and is led by 
Massachusetts-based Digital Equipment Corp and the Harvard 
Community Health Plan, is working with NCQA to establish such 
NCQA Issues Findings of Pilot on Managed Care 
Performance Measures 3 HCPR 9 d54 (February 2 7 1995) ; NCQA 
Pilot Project Aims to Make Measures Comparable, Accurate, 
Modern Healthcare 6 0 (March 20, 19 95) . Participating HMOs will 
each have paid $100,000 for their involvement in the project. 
Paul J. Kenkel, New England HMOs, Employers, Proceed with 
"Report Card", Modern Healthcare, Apr. 11, 1994, at 18. 
44 Louise Kertesz, Kaiser Releases HEDIS Information, 
Modern Healthcare, July 11, 1994, at 6; Consumer Protection and 
Quality Assurance Under Health Care Reform, 1994: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Health for Families and the Uninsured 
of the Senate Committee on Finance, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 
(forthcoming 1994) (statement of Margaret O'Kane, President, 
National Committee for Quality Assurance). 
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a system.45 In an independent project that has discouraged 
proponents of a nationally uniform data system, Cigna 
Healthcare will pay Minnesota-based United Healthcare Corp., 
which covers approximately 23 million beneficiaries in managed 
care plans in 20 cities, approximately $3 million in 1994 and 
1995 to produce its own report cards.46 
The private sector is now leading the effort to develop 
meaningful tools to compare health plans and providers. 
Representatives of thirty major corporate employers, including 
American Express, AT&T, UPS, GTE Corp., and Ameritech gathered 
at Jackson Hole, Wyoming to designate five conditions as the 
initial focus for the quality assurance efforts of their 
health plans and providers: asthma, breast cancer, coronary 
artery disease, diabetes, and lower back pain.47 With the 
leadership vacuum created by the demise of federal health care 
reform, these corporate players are now using their market 
power to set the quality assurance agenda for the next 
century. 
Xerox has emerged as a leader in the corporate report 
card sector. Its benefits management system, dubbed 
HealthLink, may become a blueprint for a privatized report 
card industry that would fill the void left by stalled federal 
45 Kenkel, supra note 43, at 18. 
46 Paul J. Kenkel, United Healthcare, Cigna Mavericks 
on Report Cards, Modern Healthcare, Apr. 4, 1994, at 44, 44. 
47 Jackson Hole Group Selects Conditions for Initial 
Outcomes Measurement Plan, 3 HCPR 40 d39 (October 9, 1995) . 
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legislation. Rather than commit all of its 170,000 disparate 
employees to a single managed care plan, Xerox has contracted 
plan oversight to six regional "network managers," who 
administer numerous local managed care plans eager to enroll 
Xerox employees. These network managers tend to be large 
corporations already active in the managed care arena: US 
Healthcare, Prudential Insurance, Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
of Rochester (N.Y.), Kaiser Permanente, and the HMO Group. As 
part of their administrative duties, network managers collect 
and distribute report card data from numerous local managed 
care plans. (See Appendix A for typical Kaiser and US 
Healthcare report cards.) Eligible plans must provide 
standardized quality and satisfaction data to network 
managers. Xerox distributes these report cards to employees 
and then, in a strategy known as "benchmarking," offers them 
financial incentives to choose the least costly plans. As a 
result, Xerox has had impressive success in controlling its 
health care expenditures.48 However, it remains to be seen 
whether cost or satisfaction data guide employees' choices 
significantly more than quality data, or even whether quality 
data influence such choices at all. Looking from the other 
side of the examining table, providers and health plans 
clearly believe that employers focus more on price than on 
48 For 55 HMOs contracting with one of Xerox' s six 
network managers, the premium increase for 1994 was only 1.1%, 
well below the industry average. Christine Woolsey, Employers 




quality when making health plan purchasing decisions. In one 
survey, two-thirds of managed care companies ranked price 
first or second in importance when choosing among variables 
important in marketing their services. Outcomes were ranked 
first or second only 9% of the time (Fig. 1).49 
Figure 1 . Provider 
and managed care views 
on seven factors for 
success in the 
marketplace 
Factors Percentage Ranked 
£i.XgiL._£>p_-S.g-QQM 
Price 69% 
Patient Satisfaction 50 
Provider Access 31 
Quality Improvement Process 20 
National Network Affiliation 11 
Clinical Guidelines/Protocols 10 
Published Outcomes 9 
Source: Survey on Outcomes Management, Foster 
Higgins, 1994 
D. Growth of the Report Card Industry: De Jure or De Facto 
Reform 
The information disclosure programs endorsed by the HSA 
and its various legislative descendants described the concept 
of a consumer-directed, information-based, quality and cost 
control program. For the substance of such a program, 
consumers must await the results of work carried out by some 
combination of National Health Boards, National Quality 
Survey by Foster Higgins, a New York benefits 
consulting firm. Rhonda Bergman, Study: Employers Consider 
Cost Over Quality in Health Purchases, 6 8 Hosp . 54 (1994) . 
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Management Councils, Regional Professional Associations or 
Quality Improvement Foundations, Alliances, state governments, 
and private organizations. This work has already begun in 
earnest. Corporate benefits managers and independent network 
managers with corporate clients are now set to implement 
report card systems, whether or not Congress succeeds in 
passing a reform bill that legislates federal or state 
responsibility for the ultimate administration of information 
disclosure. 
The private sector's financial incentives to develop 
effective report card systems are immense. Employers such as 
Xerox clearly covet the potential direct cost savings if 
workers respond to the cost information contained on report 
cards. Less obvious, but potentially far more lucrative for 
the victor, is the new battleground over developing the report 
card standard in what has become the health care growth 
industry of the twenty-first century. The Mitchell Plan 
proposed a $2.4 billion budget for the National Quality 
Council, Quality Assurance Foundations, and Consumer Advocacy 
Centers; much of this sum would have been used for 
subcontracting. The proliferation of state, corporate, and 
federally-funded efforts to produce report cards has created 
a new billion-dollar industry in health care information 
processing and distribution. Corporations and managed care 
plans, as direct providers of health care services or as 
network managers, may soon control the flow of health care 
r . .,ns-'sb»J 
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information and, with it, billions of dollars in health care 
benefits. The AHCPR's multi-million dollar demonstration 
project, which is expected to produce its first comprehensive 
report card within four years, is awarding initial six-month 
contracts for the design of the consumer survey phase of the 
program. Given their investment in data systems, each of 
these various private actors have a significant interest in 
the adoption of their benchmarks and format as the national 
standard. 
E. The Goals of Information Disclosure in Health Care 
Without exception, policymakers have embraced consumer- 
directed information disclosure as the key to their quality 
assurance proposals.50 Disclosure attempts to equalize the 
bargaining relationship between individual consumers and 
providers so as to minimize noncompetitive bargaining. 
Informational equality prevents inefficiencies that usually 
take the form of noncompetitive pricing. Disclosure 
supporters argue that informing consumers will avoid extensive 
direct price regulation.51 Disclosure can also serve 
Information disclosure is both a market protection 
and consumer protection device. In general economic terms, 
disclosure is aimed at correcting informational asymmetries 
between producers and purchasers which can lead to market 
failure. 
51 See Griffith L. Garwood et al. , Consumer Disclosure 
in the 1990s, 9 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 777, 779-81 (1993) ; Howard 
Beales et al. , The Efficient Regulation of Consumer 
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consumer protection goals by enhancing product quality. 
Requiring disclosure of important product or service 
characteristics discourages producers from cutting quality 
corners; producers that cut corners are likely to lose market 
share because informed consumers will recognize the quality 
gap between different products and change their purchasing 
behavior accordingly.52 
In the health care context, a policy of consumer-directed 
information disclosure may have several specific goals. 
First, disclosure may be considered an end in its own right. 
Consumers, it is argued, have a right to know about their 
health care providers ahead of time. Accordingly, disclosure 
programs are justified whether or not consumers use the 
Information, 24 J. L. & Econ . 491, 501-509 (1981) (discussing 
market failures that occur in the production of information in 
classical economic terms). 
Information disclosure has become an increasingly 
important component of the federal government's contribution 
to consumer protection. Until recently, such regulation 
focused primarily on mandatory disclosure of health risks. 
Government agencies and statutes require risk labeling for 
tobacco products, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1334 (1993); 
pharmaceuticals, 21 U.S.C. §§ 351-360ee (1993); asbestos, 
pesticides, and other toxins, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2655 (1993); 
and saccharin products, 21 U.S.C. § 343 (o) (1993). 
Furthermore, under the Emergency Planning and Community Right 
to Know Act of 1986, companies must report the health effects 
of toxic chemical storage and release, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9622 
(1993) . 
Information disclosure has moved beyond risk warnings and 
is now an important part, or even the primary purpose, of a 
number of federal laws. For instance, the Truth in Savings 
Act requires banks to release standardized financial data to 
patrons, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4313 (1993), and the Fair Credit 
and Charge Card Disclosure Act of 1988 mandates standardized 
credit term disclosure, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1610, 1632, 1637, 1640, 
1646 (1993) . 
■ 
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information generated. A second possible goal, and one that 
is a particular focus of the Clinton administration, as well 
as numerous legislators and corporate benefits managers, is 
cost containment. Armed with the kinds of information 
provided by report cards, consumers will foster price 
competition among plans, thus holding down overall costs by 
rewarding low cost plans with their business. A third goal is 
quality improvement. By disclosing quality data, report cards 
may threaten the market share of low-quality plans, and thus 
stimulate quality improvements. In order to attract new 
subscribers, plans would have to modify their delivery of care 
to score well against the quality benchmarks established for 
the report cards. 
Report cards advance these policy goals with varying 
degrees of success. Disclosure for disclosure's sake is self- 
validating, although a simpler format might achieve this 
limited goal just as well as a report card. Price disclosure 
may foster cost containment, but there is little supporting 
evidence. At the very least, third-party insurance or 
employer-based subsidies insulate most consumers against true 
price sensitivity, and national report card programs are 
themselves prohibitively expensive. The third policy goal — 
quality assurance — may be the one to which report cards are 
least suited. Given the limited state of the art in the 
science of quality measurement, it is unclear that disclosed 
information accurately reflects quality health care delivery. 
■ 
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These limits, coupled with uncertainty over how consumers 
integrate this information into their health care choices, 
make the impact of comprehensive disclosure on quality unknown 
at best, and illusory or counter-productive at worst. To the 
extent that price information sways consumers more than 
quality data, quality assurance suffers. To the extent that 
satisfaction and quality data are not interchangeable and the 
former more persuasively guide consumer choice, then report 
cards again fail to achieve quality assurance. 
F. Conclusion: Acceptance of the working hypothesis that 
report card systems are the cornerstones of recent 
federal and state legislative/regulatory initiatives and 
private sector efforts to reform quality assurance 
programs in health care. 
Through the formulation of national quality measures and 
the dissemination of performance data to consumers, policy¬ 
makers hope to create a market in which health care providers 
compete in terms of price and quality, thus assuring quality 
and containing costs. To achieve this vision, most 
legislative drafts propose a dizzying array of boards, 
councils, and foundations to marshal the numerous players into 
producing a large quantity of data. Whether through public 
mandate or the promise of private reward, a faith in report 
cards is taking hold. 
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However, the collection of data is only a first step. 
Translating raw data into manageable and comprehensible 
information that consumers will actually use to make 
discriminating quality decisions is a far harder task. 
Neither policymakers, nor the national boards and regional 
agencies they would create, nor the private corporations that 
are leading the managed care revolution are yet capable of 
taking that second step. Parts II and III of this discussion 
and acceptance of the remaining working hypotheses explain why 
this is the case. 
II. The Current State of the Art in Quality Measurement 
Programs 
Existing report card proposals promise more than they can 
deliver. The undeveloped science of quality measurement, the 
high costs of data gathering, compilation, and dissemination, 
and uncertainty about how consumers respond to disclosed 
information undermine the quality assurance objectives of 
report card systems. Congressional reform and private sector 
initiatives must account for these various limitations. 
First, the science of quality management is still in its 
infancy, "making it unlikely that it could be applied on a 
national scale any time soon."53 The crude tools now 
Barry Meier, Health Plans Promise Choice But 
Decisions May Be Hard, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1994, at A1, B8. 
Meier notes the following assessment by David Eddy, a noted 
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available -- mortality rates, vaccination rates, numbers of 
procedures performed, malpractice actions brought or settled - 
are not sufficient to inform consumer choice fully. 
Administration officials admit that development of quality 
measurement techniques could take ten years.54 Others view 
that as outrageously optimistic.55 It is simply unrealistic 
to take the few quality-related indicators now available, 
standardize them nationally and regionally for case-mix, 
severity of illness, demographics, patient load, and a host of 
other barely-recognized risk adjustment factors, and produce 
a report card grade that has any meaningful relationship to 
the quality of care delivered. Simply identifying useful 
quality indicators is a monumental task.56 
Second, the costs of implementing report card proposals 
could be prohibitive. In addition to the direct costs of 
creating various bureaucracies (the National Health Board, the 
expert in quality research, who helped to draft the quality 
provisions of the HSA: " [A] nyone who believes that we have all 
the measures we need right now is kidding themselves." Id. 
See Kathleen N. Lohr et al. , Current Issues in 
Quality of Care, Health Aff., Spring 1988, at 5, 6 (1988) 
(defining quality remains major challenge); David Eddy & John 
Billings, The Quality of Medical Evidence: Implications for 
Quality of Care, Health Aff., Spring 1988, at 19, 20 
(development of reliable standards requires better data and 
greater ability to analyze than is presently available); 
Phillip Caper, Defining Quality in Medical Care, Health Aff., 
Spring 1988, 49, 51 (setting quality standards is currently an 
ad hoc process). 
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National Quality Management Council, and the regional 
foundations proposed in several of the reform plans), 
substantial indirect costs for data gathering will fall 
squarely on plans and providers. The direct price tag for 
producing the report cards nationally may be several billion 
dollars, and the financial burden of the indirect costs of 
data production on unprepared providers could exceed that 
figure.57 
Third, most health care institutions are not equipped to 
produce the kinds of data required for a report card. 
Electronic information systems, which were crucial components 
of the massive data gathering proposal advanced in the Clinton 
Plan, have only recently arrived in large hospitals. Most 
such systems are oriented more towards billing than clinical 
care, and efforts to refocus these databases towards clinical 
care and quality measurement are still in the experimental 
stage.58 Thus far, the most comprehensive development has 
Rhonda Bergman, Report Cards Will Be Used To Measure 
the Performance of Health Plans: How Might They Work?, 
Hospitals, Oct. 20, 1994, at 70 (estimate by Dr. Robert Brook, 
head of health sciences program at RAND Corp.). 
58 For example, the Ischemic Heart Disease Patient 
Outcomes Research Team (PORT) reported on the unreliability of 
many hospital administrative data bases (as opposed to 
clinical data bases), given the former's poor recording of 
comorbidities. PS Romano, LL Roos et al, A comparison of 
administrative versus clinical data: coronary artery bypass 
surgery as an example, 47 J Clinical Epidemiology 249-60 (1994) . 
See also AJ Hartz and EM Kuhn, Comparing hospitals that 
perform coronary artery bypass surgery: the effect of 
outcomes measures and data sources, 84 Am J Pub Health 1609-14 
(1994)(concluding that administrative data is inadequate to 
assess quality care and that comparisons between providers are 
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been the trial of the Integrated Inpatient Management Model at 
the University of Michigan Hospital. This ambitious clinical 
information system, covering two internal medicine wards, 
combined computerized resource-use and procedure tracking with 
non-punitive feedback to aid providers in identifying and 
managing resource-intensive patients. Though promising, this 
small trial represents only a starting point for the 
development of process-oriented quality management data 
systems.59 After a year's frustrating experience with its 
report card pilot program for Medicaid recipients in three 
states, the Agency for Health Care Policy Research (AHCPR) 
concluded that both states and plans need significant lead 
time to conduct the clinical studies and surveys required for 
report cards. Even then, one administrator noted, 
establishing interagency coordination of monitoring and 
oversight is "easier said than done."60 
Moreover, clinical information systems remain hospital- 
based. They have not yet focused on non-institutional 
outpatient settings, where the vast majority of routine health 
difficult unless measured outcomes are defined identically for 
given procedures). 
See Frederick A. Creighton et al. , An Integrated 
Inpatient Management Model, Health Care Mgmt Rev., Winter 1990, 
at 61; Lawrence F. McMahon et al., The Integrated Inpatient 
Management Model: A New Approach to Clinical Practices, 111 
Annals of Internal Med. 318 (1989) . 
u State Medicaid Directors Hear Reports on Methods of 
Measuring Quality of Care, 2 HCPR 44 d22 (November 7 1994), 




care takes place. Some large provider networks are preparing 
for this task with substantial investment in computerized 
patient-information systems. Kaiser Permanente, the nation's 
largest HMO, recently announced a one billion dollar, decade- 
long initiative to computerize patient records and track 
medical procedures.61 
Finally, more information in the form of raw data, 
statistics, and rates may not lead to better quality-based 
decision-making on the part of consumers. It is currently 
unclear how well measurable factors reflect the quality of 
care. Moreover, cognitive biases suggest that data may be de- 
emphasized, overemphasized, or ignored.62 
The health reform movement has sparked an intense 
interest in quality programs over the last several years. In 
addition to the private investment in quality programs 
occurring in hospitals and large health plans, the federal 
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research has increased its 
budget for health care outcomes projects from $3.6 million in 
1989 to $42.6 million in 1993.63 But, so far, the "quality 
report card" movement has done little more than establish 
quality measurement as an essential element of health care 
61 Meier, supra note 53, at B8. 
62 See infra pp. 45-65. 
Joe Burns, Higher Quality Means Lower Costs, in 
Special Report, supra note 26, at 5. 
"Outcomes projects" or "outcomes research" measures what 





A. Quality Measurement in Health Care: Satisfaction, 
Process, and Outcomes 
A discussion of some current quality measurement 
programs, with a special focus on a statewide report card 
program, highlights the practical measurement, cost, and 
consumer processing problems that fledgling health care 
information disclosure strategies will inevitably encounter. 
These efforts reflect the promise and limitations of current 
quality measurement. Familiar marketing tools like consumer 
surveys are becoming increasingly important, but meaningful 
quality measurement will depend on the further development of 
techniques such as process and outcomes measurement. 
1. Surveys and Satisfaction 
Consumer surveys play an important role in health plan 
management, but their relationship to quality measurement 
remains ill-defined. Patient responses to the care received 
and its results certainly reflect satisfaction, but measure 
quality only indirectly. Dissatisfaction can result from 
unhappiness with a diagnosis or from a disability, rather than 
from substandard delivery of care. Inconvenience also plays 
a role; in one survey an important independent variable in 
predicting patient satisfaction in outpatient settings was 
' 
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time spent in the waiting room.64 One analysis of patient 
satisfaction with an outpatient endoscopy lab found that 
cleanliness, privacy, and nursing attention — rather than 
cost, treatment outcome, or technical skill — had the most 
significant impact on global satisfaction.65 The ease with 
which patients can make appointments, and the behavior of 
receptionists, are both important determinants of 
satisfaction.66 A recent research summary concluded that a 
consumer's choice of provider correlates more closely with 
judgments based on intuition, tradition, convenience, and 
word-of-mouth reputation than with objective measures of 
performance.67 One marketing study found that the yellow 
64 John C. Mowen et al. , Waiting in the Emergency Room: 
How to Improve Patient Satisfaction, J. Health Care Mktg., June 
22, 1993, at 26. 
65 L Cohen, P Delaney et al, Listening to the customer: 
implementing a patient satisfaction measurement system, 17 
Gastroenterology Nursing 110-5 (1994). 
1 Bernard R. Kingsley & Dennis N. Hodges, Economic 
Benefits of Practice Enhancement, J. Health Care Mktg., Dec. 
1988, at 67, 67-69. 
67 Robert J. Panzer & Carol Cronin, Using Information 
in Quality Improvement and Quality Assurance, in Putting Research 
to Work in Quality Improvement and Quality Assurance, Agency for Health 
Care Policy and Research/DHHS, Pub. No. 93-0034 (July 1993). 
Individual information-seeking behavior about specific 
illnesses also tends to come from a variety of subjective 
sources. See e.g., J. David Johnson & Hendrika Meischke, 
Cancer Information: Women's Source and Content Preferences, J. 
Health Care Mktg., Mar. 1991, 37 (individuals receive information 
on cancer and other health-related issues from range of 
sources, including friends and relatives, physicians, cancer- 
related organizations (telephone hotlines), and media; 
interpersonal sources are influential because they provide 
information and social support); Mark Peyrot et al., Consumer 
Satisfaction and Perceived Quality of Outpatient Health 
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pages ranked just below friends as the most valuable source of 
information for consumers in search of a physician.68 
The marketing approach to measuring quality through 
surveys is based on a relative definition of quality. 
Disparity or gap analysis measures the difference between 
initial expectations about the service provided -- formed from 
past experience, word of mouth, and advertising -- and 
consumer perceptions once service delivery is complete. 
Rather than representing an objective assessment, "quality" is 
redefined as a measure of how well care lives up to or exceeds 
preconceived expectations.69 
However, surveys do serve some important purposes. 
Improved patient satisfaction can reduce patient alienation 
from the provider, improve communication between care-giver 
and patient, and lay the groundwork for a meaningful doctor- 
patient relationship. From a managerial perspective, surveys 
Services, J. Health Care Mktg. , Jan. 1993, at 24 (finding 
significant correlation between perceptions of staff behavior, 
atmospherics, and examination comfort with increased consumer 
satisfaction and willingness to recommend provider). 
i: Cathy J. Cobb-Walgreen & Pratibha A. Dabholkar, The 
Value of Physician Advertising in the Yellow Pages: Does the 
Doctor Know Best?, J. Health Care Mktg. , Mar. 1992, at 55, 55-57. 
Cobb-Walgreen and Dabholkar note that 28% of the 20 million 
adults in the continental United States that arrange to use a 
physician's services for themselves or other family members 
through the yellow pages are first-time patients who do not 
have a specific doctor in mind when they open the directory. 
Id. 
See generally Thomas W. Whipple & Vicki L. Edick, 
Continuous Quality Improvement of Emergency Services, J. Health 
Care Mktg., Dec. 22, 1993, at 26. 
■ 
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are certainly useful. By identifying aspects of care delivery 
that consumers value, executives can better market their 
institutions.70 
Though complimentary, satisfaction and quality are not 
synonymous in the health care context. Measures of one cannot 
substitute as evidence of the other. Satisfaction is but one 
dimension in the definition of quality care; others include 
appropriateness (relevance of care provided to clinical needs, 
given current knowledge), availability, continuity 
(coordination of care among providers and organizations), 
effectiveness (skillful administration of care), efficacy 
(achievement of a desired outcome), efficiency (appropriate 
use of resources), safety, and timeliness.71 
2. Process 
Analysis of quality measurement in the service sector is 
a relatively new concept. The most significant step in 
developing quantitative measures of service quality was the 
introduction of the SERVQUAL system by Parasuraman, Zeithaml, 
and Berry in 1986. SERVQUAL was specifically designed to 
measure customer perceptions of service quality. It groups 
Id. Whipple and Edick describe how inpatient and 
outpatient satisfaction surveys were used in a multi- 
institutional emergency department chain to develop detailed 
plans for service improvement, appraise performance, recognize 






the determinants of service quality into five areas: 
tangibles (physical facility attributes, appearance of 
personnel), reliability, responsiveness, assurance (which 
encompasses aspects of communication, credibility, security, 
competence, and courtesy), and empathy (which includes both 
access to, and understanding of the customer).72 
This focus on the process of providing service rather 
than on measuring specific outcomes has only recently been 
applied to health care. Early findings suggest that 
reliability is the most valued attribute, while tangible 
aspects of service delivery (e.g., decor of the office) rank 
lowest. In determining service quality, patients, unlike 
physicians, tend to place more importance on communication 
skills and less on technical competence.73 The literature is 
inconsistent about the importance patients place on common 
proxies for technical quality such as years in practice, 
school attended, board certification, and membership in 
72 A. Parasuraman et al. , SERVQUAL: A Multiple-Item 
Scale for Measuring Consumer Perceptions of Service Quality, 
J. Retailing, Spring 1988, at 12, 23; A. Parasuraman et al., A 
Conceptual Model of Service Quality and Its Implications for 
Future Research, J. Mktg. , Fall 1985, at 41, 41-50. 
73 Stephanie W. Walbridge & Linda M. Delene, Measuring 
Physician Attitudes of Service Quality, J. Health Care Mktg., 
Jan. 1993, at 6 (concluding that traditional ranking of 
SERVQUAL categories derived from other service industries may 
not apply to health care); Joby John, Improving Quality 
Through Patient-Provider Communication, J. Health Care Mktg., 
Dec. 1991, at 51, 58 (finding that patients' perception of 
high quality care depended directly on amount of communication 
between staff and patient regarding nature of diagnosis and 
treatment; physicians tended to rate quality based on 
technical competence of service provision). 

45 
professional associations. Some authors suggest that such 
factors have a limited impact on consumer perceptions,74 
whereas others argue that consumers do value such 
attributes.75 The entire field of process measurement in 
health care remains in its infancy, and it is unclear what 
conclusions we should draw from its early contributions to 
quality assurance. 
Understanding consumers' assessment of hospital quality 
is as important as fully comprehending their reasons for 
choosing a physician. Initial studies found that tertiary 
care level and size were the most important factors positively 
related to perceptions of hospital quality. Follow-up work 
indicates that many of the "process" factors that seem 
important in satisfaction with individual providers also apply 
74 Kenneth D. Bopp, How Patients Evaluate the Quality 
of Ambulatory Medical Encounters: A Marketing Perspective, 10 
J. Health Care Mktg., Mar. 1990, at 6, 6. 
Anthony R. Kovner & Helen L. Smits, Point of View: 
Consumer Expectations of Ambulatory Care, Health Care Mngt Rev. , 
Winter 1978, at 69, 71. In the specific area of breast 
implantation, one study found that board certification was an 
"important symbol in establishing credibility in advance of 
personal experience with the service provider." See Emin 
Babakus et al., Issues in the Practice of Cosmetic Surgery: 
Consumers' Use of Information and Perceptions of Service 
Quality, J. Health Care Mktg., Sept. 1991, at 12, 17. One set of 
authors has demonstrated that the importance of process 
measures of quality depends on whether there was a successful 
treatment outcome. See Richard S. Lytle & Michael P. Mokwa, 
Evaluating Health Care Quality: The Moderating Role of 
Outcomes, J. Health Care Mktg., Mar. 1992, at 4, 4 (concluding 
after study of fertility clinic that process measures did not 
correlate with consumer quality perception upon successful 
outcome, i.e., pregnancy; but process measures did 
significantly correlate with consumer quality perception upon 
unsuccessful treatment outcome). 
, 
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to the hospital setting; "patient relations, medical staff, 
nursing staff, convenience, and technology" are identified as 
factors in determining a level of quality to consumers.76 
3. Outcomes 
Researchers in the field recognize that meaningful health 
care quality measurement requires the development of new 
tools. Coupled with a process of care analysis like SERVQUAL, 
outcomes research, which measures what happens to patients as 
the result of the treatments they receive, is one of the most 
important of these instruments. A variety of players in the 
health care field have begun to implement outcomes research 
projects. The federal Agency for Health Care Policy and 
Research is the largest sponsor of these projects, which 
include Patient Outcomes Research Teams (PORTs) to support 
large scale investigations into common medical problems such 
as low back pain, diabetes, and stroke treatment. The PORT 
projects will yield valuable outcomes data, but not quickly. 
Each individual project requires a literature review and meta¬ 
analysis, an analysis of specific diagnostic and therapeutic 
strategies, the identification of variations in clinical 
practice through a national survey of physicians, an analysis 
of quality of life and patient preferences through surveys, 
the synthesis and development of recommendations through 
Joseph A. Boscarinq, Hosp. & Health Servs . Admin., The 
Public's Perception of Quality Hospitals II: Implications For Patient 
Surveys 13-31 (1992). 

formal decision/cost effectiveness models and expert consensus 
panels, and finally, the dissemination of recommendations 
through an intervention-demonstration trial. Even before that 
exhaustive effort begins, researchers must define the relevant 
outcomes to be measured. The challenges for quality 
measurement in anesthesiology are emblematic. Are the 
relevant measured outcomes death, elimination of pathology, 
absence of pain, and recurrence of symptoms — which are 
largely functions of care given by other providers — or rather 
the incidence of acute intraoperative events like drops in 
blood pressure and tachycardia, postoperative nausea, and 
urinary retention?77 The implications for current report 
card efforts is clear: most outcomes data is simply not yet 
available. 
A joint project by the Rand Corporation and InterStudy, 
a non-profit health policy research organization, has produced 
the Outcomes Management System (OMS). This computerized 
database combines data about patient characteristics (age, 
sex, race, etc.), risk factors (tobacco and alcohol use, 
cholesterol levels, etc.), preexisting health conditions, and 
patient satisfaction with the results of a thirty-nine 
question Health Status Questionnaire (reproduced in Appendix 
B) that attempts to measure quality of life. This survey asks 
questions about daily activities and the impact of health 
77 See MM Cohen, PG Duncan et al. The Canadian four- 
centre study of anaesthetic outcomes, 3 9 Canadian J Anaesthesia 
430-9 (1992) . 
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status on abilities to walk, work, and participate in social 
activities.78 Medical centers around the country are 
currently developing disease-specific quality of life 
questionnaires for the Technology of Patient Experience (TyPE) 
project, which adds clinical and laboratory data, symptomatic 
reporting, and treatment information to the OMS approach for 
conditions such as asthma, cataracts, diabetes, and 
prostatism.79 
Connecticut hospitals launched the "Towards Excellence in 
Care" program in 1988 to apply the Connecticut Health 
Information Management Exchange (CHIME) database to the 
development of outcomes data. The CHIME database contains 
discharge abstract information and billing information for all 
of Connecticut's 34 acute-care hospitals. The "Towards 
Excellence in Care" program produces reports on care for 
particular diagnoses. For example, the report series on 
cholecystectomy (gall bladder removal) compares technical 
complications, total complications, and long post-operative 
stays at individual hospitals with the state mean (Appendix 
C) . Reports are reviewed by physician panels and directed 
towards hospital medical departments and quality assurance 
The Outcomes Management System is described in Alter 
& Holzman, supra note 26, at 10-11. The RAND Health Status 
Survey is described in Health Outcomes Inst., Outcomes Measurement 
Instrumentation 1, 1-3 (Nov. 19 93) . 
79 
Health Outcomes Inst., supra note 78, at 1-3. 
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staff rather than the public.80 
Comparison of reliable outcomes data amongst providers 
and hospitals would seem to be a prerequisite for a useful 
report card based quality assurance system, but even the most 
extensive and well funded outcomes projects are just beginning 
to publish their results. Naturally, the conclusions reached 
in many outcomes projects have serious, and sometimes counter¬ 
intuitive, implications for report card systems. For example, 
one study comparing Canadian and American patients treated for 
coronary artery disease found that while Canadian patients 
underwent far fewer invasive procedures (angioplasty and 
bypass), at one year of follow-up they also had significantly 
worse functional status and higher rates of debilitating 
symptoms (angina and dyspnea).81 By the same token, a 
population-based analysis of bypass surgery rates found that 
simply reducing the number of surgical procedures in "overuse 
areas" would improve overall patient outcomes as much as 
improving technical quality.82 By simply reading procedure 
and mortality rates from a report card, consumers could not 
John T. Lynch et al. , The "Toward Excellence in 
Care" Program: A Statewide Indicator Project, 19 J. Quality 
Improvement 519, 519-29 (1993). 
81 DB Mark, CD Naylor et al. Use of medical resources 
and quality of life after acute myocardial infarction in 
Canada and the United States, 331 NEJM 1130-5 (October 27, 
1994) . 
NP Roos, CD Black et al, A Population-based approach 
to monitoring adverse outcomes of medical care, 3 3 Medical Care 
127-38 (1995) . 
. 
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possibly appreciate these important nuances of quality care 
that outcomes projects are beginning to identify. 
Even before usable quality indicators emerge from ongoing 
outcomes research, these projects have called into question 
the indicators we currently use. The initial data from the 
recent surge in outcomes research lays bare the inadequacy of 
mortality data as an adequate proxy for quality care. One 
problem with mortality data has always been its accuracy; one 
study found that coding errors in the discharge abstracts of 
Medicare patients caused some hospitals' 30-day mortality 
rates to vary from the 10th to the 90th percentiles (0.2 to 
2.2 30-day deaths per 100 admissions) .83 Even if the data 
are accurate, problems persist. By comparing 30-day and 180- 
day post-admission hospital mortality for several categories 
of cardiac patients, the Ischemic Heart Disease PORT found 
that 30-day data discriminated only the top and bottom fifths 
of the 180-day data well.84 Thus, in addition to the many 
pitfalls of using mortality data at all (especially inadequate 
risk adjustment and severity rating), the commonly used 30-day 
mortality data does not even adequately reflect slightly 
longer term mortality for 60% of hospital providers. 
One important contribution outcomes research has had to 
J Green and N Wintfeld, How accurate are hospital 
discharge data for evaluating effectiveness of care?, 31 
Medical Care 719-31 (1993). 
84 DW Garnick, ER DeLong et al, Measuring hospital 
mortality rates: are 30-day data enough?, 2 9 Health Services 
Research 679-95 (1995). 
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efforts to measure health care quality is the inclusion of 
"health-related quality of life" (HRQL) in the lexicon of 
quality assurance. One useful classification of HRQL 
described five levels: biological and physiological factors, 
symptoms, functioning, general health perceptions, and overall 
quality of life.85 The challenge in using HRQL in any 
quality assessment system, however, remains separating inputs 
beyond the control of the provider from the evaluation of the 
provider's care. 
4. Risk Adjustment 
The measurement of clinical outcomes as part of a larger 
effort to reach generalizable conclusions about quality must 
incorporate the daunting process of risk adjustment. While 
the pitfalls of risk adjustment under the Clinton Plan, or any 
reform proposal, are beyond the scope of this paper, some 
general observations suffice to outline the challenge. 
Individual patients are different in so many ways that 
establishing a reference group is often problematic. The 
presence of several illnesses in the same individual, or 
comorbidity, can significantly affect the outcome measurement 
of the primary disease. The interdependence of diagnoses is 
particularly important in elderly populations. Quality 
measures must account for these confounding factors. 
;i‘ IB Wilson and PD Cleary, Linking clinical variables 
with health-related quality of life. A conceptual model of 
patient outcomes, 273 JAMA 59-65 (1995). 
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5. Challenges in Quality Measurement 
Other challenges abound in the quality research arena. 
Databases are incomplete and often incompatible with other 
systems.86 Outcomes projects are labor intensive for both 
patient and provider, and the results obtained about different 
treatments are not usually products of randomized trials. 
Perhaps the greatest challenge in quality research is cost. 
One consultant estimated start-up costs for an outcomes 
program measuring a modest number of variables to be $350,000 
to $550,000 over the first two years and ongoing costs of 
$100,000 to $250,000 per year.87 
B. The Pennsylvania Report Card Program 
The most ambitious and controversial attempt to combine 
advances in health care quality measurement with consumer- 
directed information disclosure is taking place in 
Pennsylvania. In 1986, the General Assembly created the 
Health Care Cost Containment Council to collect and publish 
cost and quality data from hospitals.88 The Clintons, in 
Many hospitals, for instance, computerize only their 
inpatient care data, leaving outpatient clinic or ambulatory 
surgery information unrecorded. 
Dale Shaller, senior consultant to the employers 
participating in the Cleveland Health Quality Choice program, 
provides these estimates. Employers get involved in outcomes 
research, in Special Report, supra note 26, at 26, 27. 
dH Health Care Cost Containment Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 
35, §§ 449.1-449.19 (1993); administrative regulations found 
at 28 Pa. Code § VI (1993) . 
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fact, pointed to this agency as the model for their proposed 
quality program.89 The state legislature directed the 
Council to collect charge, payment, and financial data, 
readmission rates, mortality rates, morbidity rates, and 
infection rates until more scientific quality and outcomes 
measures were developed. The Council published its first 
series of Hospital Effectiveness Reports in 1990, and new data 
is compiled annually.90 Hospitals are invited to comment on 
any aspect of the report; the Council publishes their 
responses separately.91 
The report on 1991 data was released on February 3, 1994. 
It discloses the number of patients treated within 53 
Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) at each hospital. Within each 
DRG, the report presents the average admission severity score 
(based on degree of organ failure and scored from 0 to 4) , the 
percentage of patients age 65 and over, the death rates and 
The Clinton Health Care Proposal: Hearings Before 
the House Comm, on Ways and Means, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(Sept. 28, 1993) (remarks by First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton 
urging Pennsylvania Costs Containment Council as model); The 
Clinton Health Care Plan: Hearings Before the Senate Comm, on 
Labor and Human Resources, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 29, 
1993) (remarks by First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton). 
Pennsylvania Health Care Cost-Containment Council, Pub. HE6-1- 
8 9 Hospital Effectiveness Report 1989:1 (1990). See also Pa. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 35, §§ 449.7 (a) (1) (iii) , 449.5(d)(4) (1993) (data 
dissemination and publication); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 28, §§ 
911.1-911.6 (1993) (data submission and collection); Pa. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 28, §§ 912.1-912.81 (1993) (data reporting 
requirements). 
91 See Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council, Pub. 
No. HE9-91 v.4 , Formal Comments : Hospital Effectiveness Report for Region 
9 (Sept. 1993) [hereinafter Formal Comments] . 
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major morbidity rates as compared to expected values from 
statistical models, average length of stay, and the average 
charge at each hospital. The report also includes summary 
statistics for each hospital that combine all the information 
across DRGs and present average charges adjusted for case-mix. 
Case-mix adjustment raises or lowers the average charge based 
on the number of patients treated within more costly DRGs.92 
(A report for a single DRG and a summary statistic chart from 
the 1991 Hospital Effectiveness Report are attached in 
Appendix D.) 
The Council has recently begun to publish a separate 
report series: A Consumer Guide to Coronary Artery Bypass 
Graft Surgery. These pamphlets disclose physician-specific as 
well as hospital-based data from 1990 and 1991 (Appendix E). 
The 1990 report identified 14 out of the 170 surgeons and 7 
out of the 34 hospitals as having more patient deaths than 
expected. The average charge for the operation ranged from 
$83,851 at Graduate Hospital to $21,063 at Reading Hospital in 
1990.93 The report on 1991 data, which was significantly 
See generally Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment 
Council, Pub. No. HE9-91V.4, Hospital Effectiveness Report (Sept. 1993) 
[hereinafter Hospital Effectiveness Report] ; Stacey Burling, PA 
Rates Hospitals' Effectiveness, Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 14, 
1993, at Bl. 
Marc Kaufman, Health Panel's Report Compares Heart 
Surgeons' Patient Deaths, Philadelphia Inquirer, Nov. 20, 1992, at 
A1 (reporting that the release of the heart bypass report was 
prompted by high-interest, high-risk, and high-cost); David 
Zinman, Keeping Score: The New Trend Toward Evaluating 
Medical Care, 7 American Health 56, 60-62 (1993). Hillary Rodham 
Clinton exaggerated the power of the Council report to 
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delayed by budget cutbacks, identified 6 of 176 surgeons and 
0 of 35 hospitals with more patient deaths than expected. The 
average charge for a bypass operation varied from $89,236 at 
Graduate Hospital to $23,205 at Reading.94 The Council does 
not disclose physician-specific charges. 
Critics charge that the statistically modelled risk- 
adjustment is grossly inadequate,95 and that mortality rates 
comprehensively measure quality when she testified before the 
House Ways and Means Committee that there were no quality 
differences between Graduate and Reading Hospitals despite the 
cost discrepancy. The Clinton Health Care Proposal: Hearings 
on H.R. 3600 Before the House Ways and Means Comm. , 10 3d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1993) (testimony of First Lady Hillary 
Rodham Clinton). 
94 Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council, 2 A Consumer 
Guide to Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery 2 3 (1991) [hereinafter 
Consumer Guide to Bypass Graft Surgery] . 
See Mark S. Blumberg, Biased Estimates of Expected 
Acute Myocardial Infarction Mortality Using MedisGroups 
Admission Severity Groups, 265 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 2965 (1991) 
(criticizing the "admission severity group" risk adjustment 
process under the Council-mandated Medical Illness Severity 
Grouping System (MedisGroups) for hear^Xxattacks; finding that 
estimated death rates were biased for age, location of the 
heart damage, history of heart failure, blood levels of 
potassium and urea, pulse rate, and blood pressure, while 
neglecting many other risk factors); Burling, supra note 92, 
at B1 (reporting dissatisfaction within the Pennsylvania 
hospital industry with the MedisGroup risk-adjustment system; 
giving the example that the rates are not adjusted for 
mortality due to patient-directed DNR ("Do not Resuscitate") 
orders); Wilbur B. Pittinger, Comparing Hospital Costs Not 
Simple, Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 12, 1993, at A10, and Letter 
from Wilbur B. Pittinger, Executive Director, Hospital of the 
University of Pennsylvania, to Ernest J. Sessa, Executive 
Director, Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council 
(Sept. 3, 1993), in Formal Comments, supra note 91, at § E 
(arguing that effectiveness reports are poor consumer guides 
to quality because the risk adjustment process for patient 
severity underestimate the complexity of cases at academic 
teaching hospitals relative to community hospitals and because 
mortality rates do not account for DNR orders); Letter from 
* 
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are a poor proxy for quality.96 One re-analysis of the data 
showed that random variation in patients diagnosed with low 
mortality conditions (pneumonia) produced a 60% chance that 
one or more of the participating hospitals would be falsely 
identified as a "high-mortality outlier" when simplistic 
Robert B. Kimmel, Senior Vice President, Albert Einstein 
Health Care Network, to Ernest J. Sessa, Executive Director, 
Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (Sept. 13, 
1993), in Formal Comments, supra note 91, at § A (pointing out 
that MedisGroup mortality predictions are skewed by the 
exclusion of DNR orders and refusals of treatment); Kaufman, 
supra note 93, at A1 (reporting the release of physician- 
specific mortality rates for coronary artery bypass operations 
and charges from the medical community of inadequate risk and 
severity adjustment); Kristin E. Holmes, Health-Care Report: 
Hospitals Beg to Differ, Philadelphia Inquirer, June 6, 1991, at 
H3 (reporting that proximity to a nursing home — which is not 
included in the risk-adjustment formula — may increase the 
severity of the patient-mix at an individual hospital). 
The Formal Comments, supra note 91, are filled with 
criticism of the MedisGroup risk adjustment and severity 
scoring system. One surgical group complained that full 
cardiac arrest immediately prior to a CABG operation with CPR 
continuing until the incision received only a 2.5 out of 4 on 
the severity scale. See Letter from Dr. George J. Magovern, 
Cardio-Thoracic Surgical Associates, Inc., to Ernest Sessa, 
Executive Director, Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment 
Council (Jan. 18, 1994) , in Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment 
Council, 2 Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery: Hospital and Physician 
Comments (1994) . 
In response to these criticisms, the Council increased 
the number of risk adjustment factors it used to predict 
patient mortality in Consumer Guide to Bypass Graft Surgery, supra 
note 94, covering 1991 data. It now adjusts for age, gender, 
previous bypass surgery, shock, congestive heart failure, 
renal dialysis, renal failure, recent heart attack, and 
diabetes in addition to the MedisGroup severity index for 
vital organ failure. Id. at 6-7. 
^ See generally Stephen F. Jencks, Quality Assurance, 
263 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 2679 (1990) (summarizing studies that 
suggest sensitivity and specificity of mortality rates as 
proxy for quality depends largely on risk adjustment process). 
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statistical models were used.97 Some fear that emphasis on 
mortality rates, coupled with insufficient risk adjustment for 
illness severity, will prompt hospitals to avoid taking the 
sickest patients.98 One recent refinement in the 1991 
Hospital Effectiveness Report has been separate reporting for 
cancer and non-cancer patients within DRGs where cancer is a 
common underlying condition. 
Other critics complain that the average cost data is 
misleading; the Council does not correct for location-specific 
property values, wage rates, teaching costs, or charge 
differences attributable to interest on debt incurred for 
renovation and modernization.99 More importantly, the cost 
charged does not reflect the actual payment received. For 
example. Graduate Hospital received an average of $23,974 of 
its $83,851 charge in 1990 and $24,716 of its $89,236 charge 
in 1991, and Reading Hospital collected $18,221 from its 
$21,063 1990 charge and $19,021 from its $23,205 charge in 
AR Localio, BH Hamory, et al, Comparing hospital 
mortality in adult populations with pneumonia. A case study 
of statistical methods in a managed care program, 122 Ann. Int . 
Med. 125-32 (1995) . 
Kaufman, supra note 93, at Al (quoting opinion of 
director of Hospital of University of Pennsylvania's quality 
assurance program, "It's going to be very difficult to sustain 
our role in the community (of taking any patient, no matter 
how sick) if there is extensive pressure to get our rates 
down"). 
Ralph Vigoda & Stacey Burling, Report on Costs: The 
Hospitals Beg to Differ, Philadelphia Inquirer, June 6, 1991, at 
M3 (quoting Ellen Mattes, public relations manager for Bryn 
Mawr Hospital); Holmes, supra note 95, at H3. 
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Figure 2. Comparison of 1990 Charges VS Average Collections 
for CABG Surgery at Hospitals Participating in PHCCC Program 
O Average Collection ■ Average Charge 
Figure 2. Source: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council and 
Individual Hospital Information Offices, 1995 
1991 (see Fig. 2 and Fig. 3) .100 To the extent that 
consumers actually base their decisions on charges — a tenuous 
assumption given their insulation from health costs through 
third party payment — the charge data is clearly misleading. 
The narrower $5,753 (1990) or $5,695 (1991) range of the more 
100 Dana Priest, Hospital Bills Can Prove Hollow Basis 
for Comparison of Health Care Costs, Wash. Post, Oct. 13, 19 93, 
at A6; Letter from Samuel H. Steinberg, President and CEO of 
Graduate Hospital, to Ernest J. Sassa, Executive Director, 
Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (Sept. 8, 
1993) in Formal Comments, supra note 91, at § C (stating that 
received percentage of the actual charge varied from 17.4% to 
38.2% for 14 of most common DRGs) ; Letter from Samuel H. 
Steinberg, President and CEO of Graduate Hospital, to Ernest 
J. Sassa, Executive Director, Pennsylvania Health Care Cost 
Containment Council (January 20, 1994) , 2 Pennsylvania Health Care 
Cost Containment Council, Formal Comments: Coronary Artery Bypass Graft 
Surgery, Hospital and Physician Comments, (1994) . 
. 
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Figure 3. Comparison of 1991 Charges VS Average Collections 
Figure 3. Source: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council and 
Individual Hospital Information Offices, 1995 
relevant collected fee is likely to influence patients and 
employers far less than the dramatic, but ultimately 
meaningless $62,788 or $66,031 variation in charges. The 
hospitals also complain about the roughly $150,000 per year 
direct cost of mandated participation. They contend that the 
total cost to the state's hospitals for compliance with the 
various Council studies has been $28 million to date.101 
In what may be its most important task in the next few 
101 Melissa Dribben & Stacey Burling, Hospitals Contest 
Report's Diagnosis, Philadelphia Inquirer, Sept. 2, 1990, at H4 ; 
Priest, supra note 100, at A6. The president of the Delaware 
Valley Hospital Council also estimated that it cost its 60 
member hospitals about $10 million to install computer systems 
for reporting data to the Council. See Wanda Motley, Hospital 
Study is Criticized as Narrow, Shallow, Philadelphia Inquirer, 
August 30, 1990, at H27. 
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years, the Council has begun to study how, or indeed if, 
consumers have used the published reports.102 One anecdotal 
report reveals the complexity of consumer response. A patient 
told the president of a low-cost hospital that she was 
switching to another institution because she thought "she 
could get better care at a place that charged more."103 The 
results from an earlier project are also instructive. After 
HCFA's 
publication of hospital mortality rates in 1987, one study 
found that the "death list" had no discernible behavioral 
effects on consumer choice of hospital.104 
C. Other Experiments with Report Card Systems 
In addition to the Pennsylvania program, several other 
demonstration projects are experimenting with the report card 
format. As previously mentioned, private agencies, managed 
care plans, and major corporations have created a new industry 
in health care information processing by embracing report 
cards. A number of major managed care plans are using NCQA's 
employer-sponsored Health Plan Employer Data and Information 
Set (HEDIS) — which compiles technical, access, satisfaction, 
102 Meier, supra note 53, at B8. 
103 Vigoda & Burling, supra note 99, at M3. 
104 Bruce Vladeck et al. , Consumers and Hospitals: The 
HCFA "Death List", Health Aff., Spring 1988, at 122, 122-25. 
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utilization, and plan management data into a performance 
report — to compare individual plan performance against 
benchmarks. NCQA plans to release an improved version of 
HEDIS, HEDIS 3.0, by 1997 in an attempt to capture the report 
card market; the improvements are designed to address 
criticism that HEDIS is not patient-oriented, performs no risk 
adjustment, is insensitive to special characteristics of poor 
(Medicaid) patients, and instead focuses too much on managed 
care administrative data. Kaiser Permanente, for example, has 
named HEDIS as the cornerstone of a pilot program scheduled 
for January 1996 to produce a report card in California as 
part of the California Cooperative HEDIS Reporting 
Initiative.105 
The initial versions of most HEDIS-based report cards 
compare plan-specific rates in several categories with either 
comparable plans, the national average, or goals established 
by the Department of Health and Human Services' Healthy People 
2000: National Health Promotion and Disease Prevention 
Objectives. These categories may include: preventive 
services such as childhood immunization, cholesterol 
screening, mammography screening and cervical cancer screening 
rates; prenatal care indices including the percentage of low 
birth weight babies and the incidence of early prenatal care; 
data on specific chronic diseases such as hospitalization 
105 Health Plans Face Increasing Demands for Data to 
Help Evaluate Performance, 3 Heath Care Policy Report 4 7 d41 
(November 27, 1995). 

62 
rates for asthma patients; access indicators reflecting the 
ease of making an appointment, and general patient 
satisfaction rates.106 But even NCQA's vice president of 
planning and development admits: "We don't know yet how good 
these performance measures are."107 The Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) also plans 
to publish a summary of hospital compliance with 50 areas of 
accreditation standards and has recently developed its own 
quality data base to compete with HEDIS. By 1997, JCAHO plans 
to leverage its power as an accreditation body into the report 
card market by making reporting into its Indicator Measurement 
System (IMS) mandatory for hospitals seeking 
accreditation.108 
Self-help quality assessment is also available. On-line 
services, like CompuServe offer a number of health care 
related forums that allow users to request information. 
106 Paul J. Kenkel, Health Plans Face Pressure to Find 
"Report Card" Criteria That Will Make the Grade, Modern 
Healthcare, Jan 10, 19 94, at 41. 
107 Id. 
108 See Donald L. Zimmerman, Grading the Graders: Using 
"Report Cards" to Enhance the Quality of Care Under Health 
Care Reform, National Health Policy Forum, Issue Brief No. 642 (1994) ; 
JCAHO Performance Measurement System On-Line with 131 
Volunteer Hospitals, 2 HCPR 11 d46 (March 14, 1994); The AMA 
opposed the release of the JCAHO's IMS-based hospital 
performance report cards, citing lack of physician involvement 
in their creation and a likelihood of consumer confusion. The 
president of JCAHO acknowledged that the first report cards 
would not be made available to the public until at least 1999. 
AMA Concerned Over Release of Hospital Report Cards by JCAHO, 
2 HCPR 26 d41 (June 27, 1994). 
. 
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Subscribers can obtain data on specific diagnoses and 
treatments or request opinions about hospitals and providers 
from other members.109 Magazines like Consumer Reports, New 
York, and U.S. News & World Report now publish lists of the 
"best" regional hospitals, plans, and doctors.110 
Capitalizing on a recent flurry of report card disclosures in 
St. Louis, a specialty magazine called Health Pages now 
compiles and explains comparative performance data on local 
managed care organizations (Fig. 4) .111 
109 Cathryn Conroy, Care Takers, CompuServe Magazine, Feb. 
1994, at 10. 
See, e.g., Doug Podolsky, America's Best Hospitals, 
U.S. News & World Report, June 15, 1992, at 60 (ranking hospitals 
nationwide based on physician surveys). 
in Kenkel, supra note 106, at 41. 
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Figure 4. Example of Health Pages' HMO Report Card 
WHAT THE INDICATORS MEAN 
PoAatric hune*bcti«c Tho parcwtoge of chf- 
dr or who hovt rocolvod Em appropriate number 
of DPT (diplhario-portisslt'lotaws), Off (oral 
po&ovns), and MMI (measks-muntps-nibelo) 
■nmnanom iron unn mnjyjn rmt neons 
year of tie. 
Mammography (Brows) Cmcar Sawonfag}: 
Tho pernrtoge of woman between Em ages of 51 
and M who hod a mammogram during the previ¬ 
ous colmdor yoor. 
Pap Sion (Cervical Caacor Saeeoing): 
Thw pertontogo of women ago 18 to 64 who hod o 
pop lost during tho procoding colondv yoor. 
We thank the plans for providing this information, as defined by HEDIS 2.0 (5/93). 
Ihe data has not been verified by an outside parly for hs tompMublfty or oaurocy. 
Source: Health Pages, Winter 1993, St. Louis Edition 
Eyo Exam for DUmtfcc Tho perartego of 
■fc-i -W- -1- - l- - L-J 1 , „ ■■ill, dl ■ 
MDCSCS WO H9I Hi ■ !■■■ HHWOKM 
during tho procodfag coiondv yoor. 
Presold Cm* Tho porariogo of pngoatf 
women who bogoo Ear prenatal con hi iooir On) 
HnwJor. 
lew ttrth weight Tho porafPopo of Infants 




rio« during oadandryn. 
Cooanai SodloK Tho poraatago of woman who 
hove daCvond fair hobos wio cosoroan in tho 
past yoor. 
D. Conclusion: Acceptance of the working hypotheses that 
technological limitations make the implementation of 
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report card systems problematic in the short term; and 
that report card based quality assurance systems entail 
significant direct and hidden costs to health care 
providers and health care institutions that undermine 
their efficacy. 
This snapshot of the current state of health care quality- 
measurement shows that policymakers want to write the book on 
quality before we have learned its language. The effort to 
develop analytical systems that accurately measure quality of 
care has just begun in earnest. The initial stages of this 
research must be completed before a massive disclosure 
campaign is put in place. The multi-billion dollar price tag 
of a national report card program urges caution in mandating 
disclosure until health care quality can be accurately 
measured. Once quality measures are available, then consumer 
responses to disclosure must be further examined before the 
report cards can be given a passing grade. The insights of 
cognitive psychologists into information processing, 
information overload, and consumer behavior, added to the 
lessons learned from nutrition labeling and truth in lending 
laws, begin that exploration. 
III. Cognitive Psychology, Information Processing, and 
Disclosure Strategies: Lessons from Nutrition Labeling 
and Truth in Lending 
The identification of useful health care quality 
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indicators would hardly give a report card system instant 
credibility as a quality assurance tool. Consumers must use 
the data in ways that reward quality care. At some level, 
increased disclosure becomes too complex for consumers to 
assimilate in a reasonable search time, too expensive for 
providers, and too extensive to regulate effectively.112 A 
key step is to identify elements of disclosure that are 
meaningful in the decision-making process and that are not too 
complex or cumbersome for a system to provide. 
Simplifications of disclosure schemes, such as the revision of 
Truth In Lending Act (TILA) in the 1970s that culminated in 
the Truth In Lending Simplification and Reform Act (TLSRA), 
embody this search for a balance between the utility and 
magnitude of disclosure. This thesis examines the work of 
cognitive psychologists and marketing researchers, as well as 
two specific programs of consumer-directed information 
disclosure: nutrition labeling under the Nutrition Labeling 
and Education Act (NLEA),113 and disclosure of credit terms 
under the Truth In Lending Act (TILA) .114 
In economic terms, this represents the point at 
which marginal costs of information disclosure become greater 
than the marginal benefits. 
113 21 U.S.C. § 343-1. 
114 15 U.S.C. § 1601. 
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A. Heuristics, Biases, and Information Overload 
The increasing complexity of everyday life and the birth 
of the information age has spawned a feverish interest in how 
people process information. One commentator has noted that 
research and debate within decision-making theory and 
cognitive psychology produce over 250 new articles every 
month.115 But the study of how we internalize, comprehend, 
and act upon "objective" data is not new. In the 1950s and 
1960s, pioneers such as Paul Meehl, Ward Edwards, Herbert 
Simon, and Jerome Bruner began to explore cognitive processes, 
and thus uncovered fascinating and sometimes unsettling 
patterns in the ways that we think. These insights into our 
decision-making and information-processing abilities provide 
a useful starting point for analyzing how health care 
consumers would respond to packaged quality data. 
A fundamental tenet of the human mental condition is that 
of limits. We are limited in the amount of information we can 
use, and, equally important for this discussion, the manner in 
which we use it. The study of cognitive psychology describes 
the nature of these limitations.116 
115 Robert P. Abelson & Ariel Levi, Decision Making and 
Decision Theory, 1 The Handbook of Social Psychology 231 (Gardner 
Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 3d ed. 1985) . 
116 According to Amos Tversky, Paul Slovic, and Daniel 
Kahneman, three deans of cognitive psychology, the discipline 
is concerned with "internal processes, mental limitations, and 
the way in which the processes are shaped by the limitations." 
Kahneman et al., supra note 26, at xii. A useful summary is 
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Ward Edwards' introduction of Bayesian analysis into 
psychology produced a model of rational judgment by an 
idealized person under conditions of uncertainty. This model 
provided an "optimal rule about how opinions should be revised 
on the basis of new information."117 Researchers then began 
to explore the adaptive processes that so often confounded the 
predictions of Bayesian models in actual experience. This 
search led to numerous biases and heuristics, or "rules of 
thumb," that individuals use as cognitive tools to simplify 
difficult mental tasks. 
Ward Edwards & Detlof Von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and 
Their Implications for the Law, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 225 (1986) 
(reviewing the literature on cognitive psychology and 
suggesting three kinds of errors a lawyer may make in an 
adversary system: confusion regarding the case at hand, 
discrediting an expert witness, and luring a decision-maker 
into an erroneous decision). Other interesting work on the 
incorporation of cognitive psychology research into the law 
has occurred in the courtroom context. See the discussion of 
"jury wobble" in Lea Brilmayer, Wobble, or the Death of Error, 
59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 363 (1986) ; see also Victor J. Gold, Jury 
Wobble: Judicial Tolerance of Jury Inferential Error, 59 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 391, 406 (1986) (defining jury wobble as the 
"rendition of verdicts based on inferential error"); see 
generally Richard Lempert, Error Behind the Plate and In the 
Law, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 407 (1986) (criticizing Brilmayer's 
conclusion that "error cannot exist in the legal system in the 
commonsensical meaning of the word"); Robert S. Thompson, 
Legitimate and Illegitimate Decisional Inconsistency: A 
Comment on Brilmayer's "Wobble, or the Death of Error", 59 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 423 (1986) (classifying "decisional inconsistency," 
which he prefers to "wobble," into inevitable inconsistency, 
deliberate inconsistency, bias inconsistency, careless 
inconsistency, defective information inconsistency, and 
relationship of forms of inconsistency). 
117 Ward Edwards, Conservatism in Human Information 
Processing, in Kahneman et al., supra note 26, at 359. See 
also Ward Edwards et al., Bayesian Statistical Inference for 
Psychological Research, 7 0 Psychol. Rev. 193 (1963) . 
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Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman describe three principal 
heuristics, representative, availability, and anchoring, that 
people use to process probabilistic data, as well as the 
systematic errors and biases that these heuristics can produce 
in the cognitive process.118 These researchers and others 
identify additional factors, such as framing, invulnerability, 
and overload, that also affect the way consumers respond to 
information. Each of these elements demonstrates that health 
care consumers might not use the report cards in the manner 
intended by their architects, and, therefore, that the report 
card system might not assure health care quality. 
1. Representative Heuristics 
People tend to make judgments by representativeness. In 
other words, they draw conclusions about "A" based on the ways 
in which it resembles something familiar, "B." Consider the 
example of a report card detailing the successful cesarean 
section (C-section) birth rate in a particular health plan. 
Using representative reasoning, consumers may incorporate an 
above-average successful C-section rate into a favorable 
judgment about the plan's quality of deliveries in general, or 
118 The following discussion is based on Amos Tversky & 
Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, in Kahneman et al. , supra note 26, at 3-20, which 
originally appeared in 185 Science 1124 (1974) . See also 
Kahneman & Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, in 
Kahneman et al. , supra note 26, at 48-68, which originally 
appeared in 80 Psychol. Rev. 237 (1973); Maya Bar-Hillel, 
Studies of Representativeness, in Kahneman et al., supra note 
26, at 69; see especially id. at 81. 
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about the quality of other obstetric surgeries. Consumers 
using such representative heuristics might likewise impute a 
hospital's success in coronary artery bypass graft surgery to 
balloon angioplasty for the treatment of atherosclerotic heart 
disease. 
Representative heuristics create a number of biases. 
Representative judgments are insensitive to the prior 
probability of outcomes, or the base-rate frequency of events. 
They are insensitive to sample size, which should affect the 
probability of obtaining a particular result in statistical 
models. Representative heuristics also create an illusion of 
validity, which fosters unwarranted confidence in the 
predictive accuracy of a result based solely on the strength 
of the resemblance between the specific and stereotyped 
data.119 Finally, representative heuristics obscure the 
statistical laws of regression. That is, reasoning by 
representation masks the fact that a random sampling of inputs 
tends to converge toward a mean. Tversky and Kahneman 
demonstrate that, except in elementary examples, even the most 
sophisticated statistical researchers made systematic errors 
because of representative reasoning.120 
119 See also Stuart Oskamp, Overconfidence in Case-Study 
Judgments, in Kahneman et al. , supra note 26, at 287-2 93. 
(discussing systematic overconfidence of psychologists in 
their predictive abilities about behavior of case study 
patients due to familiarity). 
120 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Belief in Small 
Numbers, in Kahneman et al., supra note 26, at 23-31. This 
article appeared originally in 2 Psychol. Bull. 105 (1971). 
■ 
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The implications of representative heuristic biases for 
health care quality data are significant. These biases 
predict that people will tend to overdraw conclusions about 
data from a limited situation and place unwarranted confidence 
in those conclusions. The coronary artery bypass graft 
example, noted above, highlights this danger. Bypass grafts 
and angioplasty are the domain of separate departments and 
distinct specialists (cardiothoracic surgery versus 
cardiology). Furthermore, bypass graft surgery is often the 
fallback procedure for unsuccessful balloon angioplasty. At 
the very least, consumers may fail to account for the complex 
interaction between different health care services, even 
though that interaction may have significant quality 
implications. 
2. Availability Heuristics 
Another adaptive process, the availability heuristic, 
also has profound implications for the way in which consumers 
may act on health plan quality data. This paradigm 
demonstrates that "people assess the . . . probability of an 
event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be 
brought to mind."121 
121 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 118, at 11; Amos 
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for 
Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 Cognitive Psychol. 207, 220- 
22 (1973) (demonstrating that test subjects overestimated 
probability that first names permitted unambiguous 
identification of sex). 
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Availability heuristics also lead to predictable biases. 
The salience, or vividness, of the retrievable experience 
affects the dominance of the heuristic and the degree of 
cognitive error. Thus, people consistently overestimate the 
frequency of dramatic causes of death, such as accidents, 
natural disasters, and homicides, as compared to less 
spectacular events, such as disease.122 Easily imagined 
contingencies influence reasoning more than unarticulated 
fears, although both events may have the same prior 
probability of occurring. One set of researchers 
characterizes this bias as a difference in the ways in which 
we interpret concrete and abstract data. "If people are 
unmoved by the sorts of dry, statistical data that are dear to 
the hearts of scientists and policy planners, then social and 
technological progress must be impeded unless effective, 
concrete, emotionally interesting ways of communicating 
conclusions are developed."123 
One important effect of availability heuristics is that 
people tend to have a particularly difficult time thinking 
about low probability events. On the one hand, people tend to 
122 Paul Slovic et al. , Facts Versus Fears: 
Understanding Perceived Risk, in Kahneman et al., supra note 
2 6, at 4 6 6-67. 
123 Richard E. Nisbett et al. , Popular Induction: 
Information is Not Necessarily Informative, in Kahneman et 
al. , supra note 26, at 115. For additional discussion of 
biases inherent in availability heuristics, see Michael Ross 
& Fiore Sicoly, Egocentric Biases in Availability and 
Attribution, in Kahneman et al., supra note 26, at 179. 
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discount low probabilities when there is no readily 
retrievable, "available" experience. On the other, people 
overestimate probability when such experience is available. 
Rates of disease, operative mortality, infection, and the like 
are so often low that we tend to ignore or overemphasize data, 
thus introducing a significant cognitive bias into efforts to 
utilize quality information. 
Availability biases predict that quality indicators 
tracking low probability events will have diminished impact, 
even if the relation of these indicators to overall quality is 
objectively significant. Vivid information, such as 
successful limb reattachments, will assume disproportionate 
importance over less salient events, such as infection rates. 
However, a person whose family member once suffered an 
infection after a surgical procedure will overestimate the 
probability of post-surgical infections, despite a surgical 
quality grade signalling an average rate.124 In either case, 
availability biases could significantly distort the value of 
quality data. 
3. Anchoring Heuristics 
People also typically rely on an "anchoring" heuristic. 
Through anchoring, people use objective data to make 
adjustments from a subjectively constructed starting point. 
124 For a discussion of the applicability of 
availability heuristics to risk perception, see Slovic et al. , 
supra note 122, at 463-84. 
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This preconception is developed through personal experience 
and influenced in the first place by representative and 
availability heuristics. The final probability estimates, in 
which people tend to have great confidence, are inevitably 
biased toward the initial values.125 
Anchoring biases undermine the impact of objective data. 
If one person begins from the proposition that the probability 
of malpractice is only 2%, and the actual frequency is 8%, 
then he will ultimately undervalue the probability of 
malpractice through insufficient adjustment away from his 
anchoring point. Similarly, someone who presupposes 
malpractice at 20% will systematically overestimate the actual 
probability despite an objective measure of 8%. 
4. Framing Effects 
In addition to heuristic processes, the manner in which 
information is presented has a profound effect on consumer 
behavior and perceptions. This "framing effect" reveals that 
people respond differently to equivalent questions depending 
on whether they are framed as losses or gains. People prefer 
an 80% chance of survival over a 20% chance of dying, although 
the two are mathematically identical. Out of the framing 
effect developed "prospect theory," which posits that people 
are risk averse in the domain of gains, risk seeking in the 
125 See id. at 475 (discussing heuristics, 
overconfidence, and hyperprecision). 
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domain of losses, and more sensitive to losses than to 
gains.126 
Although the framing effect may be more applicable to 
individual "point of treatment" decisions, a variation of the 
basic principle shows its relevance to a yearly health plan 
"point of insurance" choice based on quality grades. Suppose 
a plan's overall surgical mortality increased in one year from 
1 in 10,000 to 1.5 in 10,000. Consumers would probably have 
a much stronger and more negative response if the data were 
framed as a 50% rise in surgical mortality.127 
The type of bias exemplified above could be minimized 
across plans by a report card with standardized presentation 
formats. Nevertheless, health care system framers should 
recognize that consumers' quality evaluations might be 
influenced by the "lossframed elements of the quality data 
set more than the "gain"- framed elements. Therefore, 
particular caution should be taken when using mortality rates 
as quality indicators for low risk procedures. Given our loss 
sensitivity, people might respond disproportionately to any 
mortality figures, however small, even if other, more 
reflective measurements of quality are available. 
17 The literature on framing effects was developed by 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky and is nicely summarized in 
Richard L. Hasen, Efficiency Under Informational Asymmetry: 
The Effect of Framing on Legal Rules, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 391 
(1990). 
127 Adapted from an example in Slovic et al. , supra note 
122. at 478-79. 
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5. Invulnerability Biases 
Finally, a cognitive illusion of invulnerability to 
disease may limit the beneficial effects of quality 
information disclosure. Researchers have noted that people 
often believe themselves to be immune from risks that they 
nonetheless admit are significant for others.128 This may be 
a defense mechanism against a complex, uncertain world filled 
with confusing probabilistic information, an attempt to reduce 
"cognitive dissonance" by ignoring disturbing data.129 One 
legal scholar has labelled this effect "motivational 
distortion."130 This author prefers the simpler "I won't get 
that" phenomenon. If healthy people feel that data about 
uncomfortable disease-related or care-related events are 
irrelevant to them, then they will make decisions based on 
criteria other than quality information. 
6. Information Overload 
Marketing and consumer behavior research adds another 
important concept to our discussion of information disclosure 
128 Paul Slovic et al. , Informing the Public About the 
Risks from Ionizing Radiation, in Judgment and Decision Making: An 
Interdisciplinary Reader 114, 116 (Hal R. Arkes & Kenneth R. 
Hammond, eds., 1986) . 
129 See George A. Akerlof & William T. Dickens, The 
Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 
307 (1982) . 
130 Cass R. Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, 




and processing — information overload. Put simply, overload 
theory postulates that consumers do not act as rational 
utility maximizers in the face of an overabundance of data; 
instead, they completely ignore most or all of the information 
presented.131 Consumers provided with too much information 
disregard most of it and, therefore, make objectively poorer 
decisions.132 Alternatively, consumers may unconsciously 
avoid overload by selectively accessing subsets of presented 
131 See Jacob Jacoby et al. , Corrective Advertising and 
Affirmative Disclosure Statements: Their Potential for 
Confusing and Misleading the Consumer, J. Mktg., Winter 1982, 
at 61, 70. 
132 Jacob Jacoby et al. , Brand Choice Behavior as a 
Function of Information Load, J. Mktg Res., Feb. 1974, at 63, 
63-69; Jacob Jacoby et al. , Brand Choice Behavior as a 
Function of Information Load: Replication and Extension, 1 J. 
Consumer Res. 33, 33-42 (1974) (confirming earlier findings of 
decline in purchasing performance with increasing product 
information load and concluding that there are finite limits 
to consumers' ability to accommodate substantial amounts of 
data within limited time span). See also Debra L. Scammon, 
"Information Load" and Consumers, 4 J. Consumer Res. 14 8, 14 8-55 
(1977) (finding that increased information load causes 
consumers to divide their attention and results in poorer 
recall; further, increased information load may impart more 
knowledge but has little demonstrable effect on attitudes, 
behavior, or brand preference); James R. Bettman et al., 
Cognitive Considerations in Designing Effective Labels for 
Presenting Risk Information, 5 J. Pub. Pol'y & Mktg. 1, 7 (1986) 
(pointing out that main issue in presenting information on 
warning labels is to present sufficient information for 
informed choices but not so much that consumers process it 
selectively and suboptimally); Naresh K. Malhotra, Information 
Load and Consumer Decision Making, 8 J. Consumer Res. 419, 427 
(1982) (finding support for theory of information overload in 
the literature on memory, information theory; criticizing 
Jacoby's original research design but supporting the 




information.133 As a result, choices are based on a fraction 
of the necessary data. 
One study refined the overload paradigm and found that 
decision effectiveness, defined as the ability to make optimal 
choices among alternatives in a set, varied directly with 
information quality and inversely with information 
quantity.134 Other studies have suggested that optimal 
levels of information disclosure will vary with type of 
consumer population and type of information presented 
(graphic, verbal, and numerical).135 
The description of information overload in the marketing 
literature initially focused on product labeling, but overload 
analysis is also applied to warning labels136 and has entered 
the legal literature in discussions of new home 
warranties,137 mortgage rules,138 prescription drug 
133 Jacob Jacoby, Perspectives on Information Overload, 
10 J. Consumer Res. 432, 435 (1984); but cf. Naresh K. Malhotra, 
Reflections on the Information Overload Paradigm in Consumer 
Decision Making, 10 J. Consumer Res. 436, 439 (1984) (arguing 
that consumers can and will become overloaded). 
134 Kevin Lane Keller & Richard Staelin, Effects of 
Quality and Quantity of Information on Decision Effectiveness, 
14 J. Consumer Res. 200, 200-213 (1987). 
135 Jacoby et al. , supra note 132, at 41 (1974); Naresh 
K. Malhotra et al., The Information Overload Controversy: An 
Alternative Viewpoint, J. Mktg. , Spring 1982, at 27, 35. 
136 Wesley A. Magat & W. Kip Viscusi, Informational Approaches to 
Regulation 90-105 (1992) . 
137 Jeff Sovern, Toward a Theory of Warranties in Sales 
of New Homes: Housing the Implied Warranty Advocates, Law and 
Economics Mavens, and Consumer Psychologists Under One Roof, 
1993 Wis. L. Rev. 13. 
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information under the Food and Drug Act,139 nutrition 
labeling, and truth in lending disclosure.140 
Advertising research further clarifies the overload 
paradigm. In one study of physician advertisements, the 
authors found surprisingly little variation in consumer 
response to low and high information ads. One possible 
explanation offered was that "people may experience a sensory 
overload in the processing of health care communication."141 
Recognition of limiting factors, such as overload and 
heuristic biases, leads to the conclusion that data disclosure 
is only a first step towards a consumer protection or quality 
assurance goal. Disclosure of objective quality measurements 
will be ineffective and possibly counterproductive, unless 
such cognitive distortions are adequately addressed. 
138 William N. Eskridge, Jr. , One Hundred Years of 
Ineptitude: The Need For Mortgage Rules Consonant with the 
Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan 
Transaction, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1083 (1984); George J. Wallace, 
"Explicit Pricing," Fraud, and Consumer Information: The 
Reform of RESPA, 12 Rutgers L.J. 183, 197-98, 206-207 (applying 
overload analysis to consumer misunderstanding of real estate 
closing costs). 
139 Comment, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Consumer- 
Directed Information — Enhancing the Safety of Prescription 
Drug Use, 34 Catholic U. L. Rev. 117, 145-47 (1984) (concluding 
that fears of information overload should not prevent 
disclosing drug information to consumers as well as 
physicians). 
140 See discussion infra part III.B-C. 
141 Cobb-Walgren & Dabholkar, supra note 68, at 55. 
■ 
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B. The Relevance of Cognitive Psychology and Information 
Overload to Health Care Policy: The Pitfalls of 
Satisficing Behavior in a Quality Assurance Program 
The theory of information overload and the relevance of 
cognitive psychology to policymaking remain hotly debated. 
Some critics contend that more information always aids the 
consumer in making choices and that information overload never 
occurs.142 Others argue that consumers can actually process 
a great deal of information, but that some definite limits 
exist. The more common limiting factor, they contend, is not 
the consumer's ability to process information, but rather 
willingness to process information.143 Yet another 
interpretation of the evidence holds that consumers may not 
overload, but instead may not "load" information at all due to 
anxiety and a desire to avoid dense textual information.144 
While cognitive psychologists provide interesting 
descriptions of the limitations on our processing abilities, 
critics argue that their work is only marginally relevant to 
policymaking on information disclosure. These critics 
describe consumers as quasi-rational actors, limited by 
142 J. Edward Russo, More Information is Better: A 
Reevaluation of Jacoby, Speller and Kohn, 1 J. Consumer Res. 68, 
71-72 (1974) (arguing that confusion decreased with increased 
data, as long as subjects took enough time to process the 
information); John O. Summers, Less Information Is Better?, J. 
Mktg Res., Nov. 1974, at 467, 467-68. 
143 Malhotra et al. , supra note 135, at 27-37. 
144 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Text Anxiety, 59 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 305, 310 (1986) . 

81 
cognitive constraints.145 This quasi- rational consumer 
"satisfices" (a term of art coined to describe consumer 
activity whereby a person reaches the best decision he can 
given the circumstances) instead of "optimizes." Satisficing 
behavior results in choosing the best alternative from a non- 
exhaustive search when search costs are high. These critics 
dismiss cognitive psychology's contribution to policy 
formation because they believe that gap between the satisficed 
and optimal choice is simply too narrow to justify extensive 
government regulation of most markets that are plagued by 
information asymmetries.146 
These critics contend that the competitive market acts as 
a safety net for our internal cognitive limitations. The 
systematic mental errors that individuals make when faced with 
raw data, they argue, do not translate into worrisome market 
Hasen, supra note 126, 126, at 392. 
146 David M. Grether et al. , The Irrelevance of 
Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 
59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 277, 277-303 (1986) . See also Roberta 
Romano, A Comment on Information Overload, Cognitive 
Illusions, and Their Implications for Public Policy, 59 S. Cal. 
L. Rev. 313, 313-327 (1986) (agreeing with Grether et al. that 
information overload is not significant issue in consumer 
law); Robert E. Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual 
Decisionmaking: An Essay on the Relationship Between 
Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 S. Cal. 
L. Rev. 329, 329-37, 361 (1986) (arguing that information 
overload and cognitive error are less relevant to legal 
analysis of consumer behavior than choice management theory, 
in which consumers follow a rational pre-set strategy of self- 
control; also arguing that the psychological literature on 
human error and decision-making leads legal analysts to the 
incorrect conclusion that inherently fallible behavior is 
correctable through legal regulation). 
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failures. Rather, the market absorbs heuristics and biases in 
two basic ways. First, so long as a few, vigilant, 
sophisticated consumers can interpret the data, they 
effectively police the market for all consumers. Second, 
consumers can accurately value their own experience with a 
product despite cognitive constraints in evaluating its 
objective characteristics, and can thus reward good producers 
with repeat business.147 
1. Price, Satisfaction, and Quality: Distinct 
Dimensions of the Market Safety Net 
But the market safety net that critics of cognitive 
psychology describe solves only part of the problem in health 
care quality assurance. Put simply, it is a satisfaction and 
cost safety net, but not a quality safety net. If, in the 
course of a non-exhaustive, cognitively constrained, search, 
satisficing consumers choose plans based on geographic 
convenience, waiting time to appointment, and staff 
pleasantries, as early evidence suggests, then the market will 
reward plans that fulfill these needs. This safety net only 
protects against failure in the satisfaction market. With 
regard to cost, the standardization of the benefits packages 
and publication of annual enrollment fees allows consumers to 
make apples-to-apples comparisons between plan services and to 
shop based on price. But this safety net only protects 
303 . 
147 Grether et al., supra note 146, 146, at 277- 
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against failure in the price market. 
For the most important goal of the report card program, 
quality assurance, there is no safety net. Satisfaction and 
quality are complimentary, but one does not guarantee or 
perfectly predict the other. Policymakers, therefore, want 
report cards to create a market for quality. However, in 
addition to the fact that we do not yet know what to measure, 
we also do not know if consumers will choose according to 
quality factors rather than satisfaction factors when given 
both types of data. 
The appeal to corporate benefits managers, who are 
particularly sensitive to employee perceptions, of relying 
heavily on satisfaction data is undeniable. In praising the 
Health Institute's Employee Health Care Value Survey, one 
Xerox executive noted that the results of consumer 
satisfaction surveys could provide the basis for 
discontinuation of the company's relationship with a 
particular plan.148 That this might be the case is not 
surprising, since management is sensitive to worker 
preferences in a number of areas besides health benefits. 
Considered in this light, decisions regarding "point of 
insurance" choices are quality decisions only to the extent 
that satisfaction approximates quality; marketing research has 
shown that the scope of that overlap in health care is 
Adam Peck, Employees Rate Health Plan Options, 
Managed Healthcare, Dec. 1993, at 36, 36 (quoting Judd Everhart) . 
. 
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completely unclear. The important point is not that such 
decision making is invalid, because it is not, but rather that 
we should not misconstrue it as quality assurance. 
Admittedly, if free substitution between quality and 
satisfaction is ever established, then this approach to 
quality assurance represents a substantially lower cost 
alternative to not only to the comprehensive report card 
systems proposed in legislation, but to all other quality 
assurance programs as well. 
If, however, identity between satisfaction and quality is 
less than perfect, then simply including both sets of data in 
the same document will not cure the defect. Put simply, if 
disclosed information related to satisfaction guides consumer 
choice more persuasively than quality data, then report cards 
will never perform the quality assurance role that has been 
predicted for them. Even if consumers do load the quality 
data, processing biases will confound consumer quality 
choices; cognitive errors could minimize the market share 
rewards for meeting typically de-emphasized quality benchmarks 
or they could exaggerate the penalties for missing over¬ 
emphasized ones. The heuristics, biases, and information 
overload paradigms described by cognitive psychologists and 
marketers are directly relevant to health care policymakers 
precisely because they reveal the quality hole in the market 
safety net. That hole should make us hesitant about claiming 




The distinction between assuring satisfaction and quality 
is crucial. Critics of cognitive psychology, like David 
Grether, Alan Schwartz, and Louis Wilde, discount internal 
processing difficulties because satisficing consumers, they 
argue, do not ignore relevant information to the extent that 
it would discourage optimally satisfying choices.149 But 
arguing that cognitive constraints are similarly irrelevant in 
the health care report card context proves the wrong point. 
The main issue in applying cognitive limitations to an 
analysis of the disclosures in the report card proposal is not 
their effects on consumer satisfaction. As Grether, Schwartz, 
and Wilde would explain, despite any biases in processing 
data, report cards certainly have the potential to increase 
satisfaction as long as the new health care market becomes 
competitive. Instead, cognitive limitations are vitally 
relevant to the quality assurance aspect of report cards in 
health care information disclosure. Satisfaction plays into 
quality assurance only insofar as the data satisficing 
consumers use can also serve as quality proxies. Since we 
have not yet developed a range of reliable quality proxies, 
the report cards cannot possibly rationally reflect quality. 
Even once those proxies are developed from the intense 
research described in Part II, if report cards are to function 
4 Grether et al., supra note 146, 146, at 284-94. See 
also Romano, supra note 146, 146, at 313-327. 
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as a quality assurance program then the task becomes that of 
designing disclosure so that satisficing decisions double as 
quality decisions. Understanding the heuristics, biases, and 
information quantity limitations described by cognitive 
psychologists — in other words, understanding the components 
of our satisficing decisions rather than simply their effects 
on satisfaction — is the only way to assure this overlap and 
turn the report cards into a quality assurance tool. 
2. Policy Implications for Report Card Systems: 
Acceptance of the working hypotheses 4) that 
evidence from the disciplines of cognitive 
psychology and marketing shows that even well 
constructed, technically sound health care report 
cards would yield fatally flawed quality assurance 
systems; and 5) that severe knowledge deficits 
regarding the useful content of health care report 
cards and confusion between ensuring consumer 
satisfaction and measuring quality renders them 
inappropriate as quality assurance tools at this 
time. 
If consumers would misinterpret, overload, or fail to 
load, in the face of complex health care quality data, then we 
must be cautious about what we expect report cards to do. If 
report card disclosure requirements are selected with the 
economic, rational utility-maximizing consumer in mind, they 
4 
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might disserve the satisficing consumer. Report cards would 
not be powerful quality or cost containment tools if people 
tend to ignore them. Even worse, over-inclusive information 
disclosure may be a counter-productive quality tool if the 
satisficing consumer fixates on parts of the data set that do 
not independently reflect quality.150 Furthermore, if 
providers recognize that consumers are basing choices only on 
specific subsets of the data, then economics dictates that 
providers will alter their behavior to meet those benchmarks. 
Many HMOs, for instance, not only measure physician-specific 
satisfaction data, but base compensation and bonus money on 
patient satisfaction rates. Therefore, it is clear that the 
satisficing decisions — whether or not they reflect quality — 
are the ones that translate into rewards of market share.151 
Consumers are neither rational utility-maximizers nor wholly 
irrational impulse buyers; characterizing the middle ground in 
each market is a prerequisite to an information disclosure 
program aimed at guaranteeing quality. Faith in report cards 
as the foundation of a quality assurance program without a 
150 For instance, waiting time for appointments is 
important to the satisficing consumer. A point of insurance 
decision based on waiting time may be valid for that consumer, 
but it only rewards quality care if waiting time is 
independently reflective of quality care. See supra 
discussion in part II. 
151 Overall, 60% of HMOs collect physician-specific 
patient satisfaction data. 60% of HMOs that collect physician 
specific enrollee satisfaction use the scores as part of the 
physician compensation/bonus program. HMOs Put Satisfaction 
Data to Work, Modern Healthcare 82 (July 24, 19 95) . 
■ 
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clear understanding of the relationship between disclosed 
price, satisfaction, quality information, and consumer 
behavior is badly misplaced. 
With this theoretical background of information 
disclosure and consumer cognitive response as our foundation, 
the discussion now turns to nutrition labeling and truth in 
lending disclosure in an attempt to demonstrate the validity 
of the working hypotheses when applied to existing consumer- 
directed information disclosure programs. 
C. The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act 
The modern regulatory system governing the food industry 
stems from the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938. 
Section 341 of the Act authorizes the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) to prohibit the mislabeling of food; 
section 343 defines mislabeled foods to include any item not 
in compliance with the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 
1990 (NLEA) .152 
Under the NLEA, Congress and the FDA have embarked on an 
ambitious attempt to use informational strategies to modify 
consumer behavior. Amendments which went into effect on May 
8, 1994, make nutrition labeling mandatory for all products 
152 Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) {amended by 
21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1993). 
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intended for human consumption and offered for sale.153 This 
effort complements the regulation of package labeling, in 
which Congress requires food producers to meet FDA definitions 
of common terms, like "free," "low," "lite," "reduced," 
"fresh," and "high."154 Assertions about positive health 
claims are permitted only if they are supported by scientific 
evidence and communicate clear and complete information about 
the links between calcium and osteoporosis, lipids and cancer, 
sodium and hypertension, cholesterol and heart disease, fiber 
and cancer, or fruits and vegetables and cancer.155 
With respect to information disclosure directly 
concerning nutritional content, the statutory provisions of 
the NLEA are quite specific. Food is deemed mislabeled by the 
statute unless its label bears nutritional information that 
provides standard serving size in an amount customarily 
consumed, the number of servings per container, the total 
number of calories derived from any source and the number 
derived specifically from fat per serving size, the amount of 
total fat, saturated fat, cholesterol, sodium, total 
carbohydrates, complex carbohydrates, sugars, dietary fiber, 
total protein per serving, and any vitamin or mineral. The 
153 58 Fed. Reg. 2175 and 58 Fed. Reg. 17328 (1993) (to 
be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 101.9) (effective May 8, 1994) . 
154 21 U.S.C. § 343 (r) ; Fair Packaging and Labeling 
Program, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1461 (1988), amended by 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1453-1454 (Supp. IV 1992). 
155 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.72-101.78 (1993). 
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goal of this lengthy disclosure is to "assist consumers in 
maintaining healthy dietary practices." The FDA, through the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, may require additions 
to or deletions from the nutritional information disclosure 
list if that assists consumers in maintaining healthy dietary 
practices. The statute also gives the Secretary authority 
over the presentation format of the nutritional information; 
she can promulgate regulations that require highlighting, 
specific typefaces, or color schemes to assist consumers in 
spotting the information.156 
The FDA regulations promulgated under the statute are 
even more extensive and specific. This degree of specificity 
extends both to content and presentation. For instance, the 
nutrition label must be contiguous and to the right of the 
principal display panel of a packaged food, and the letters 
and numbers must be no less than one-sixteenth inch in 
height.157 
Nutrition labeling constitutes an extensive section of 
the federal regulations. "Serving" is defined precisely as 
that "reasonable quantity of food suited for or practicable of 
consumption as part of a meal by an adult male engaged in 
light physical activity, or by an infant or child under 4 
156 21 U.S.C. §343 (q) ; Nutrition Labeling of Food, 21 
C.F.R. § 101.9 (1993); 21 C.F.R. § 101.12 (1993) (listing 
major product categories and reference amounts customarily 
consumed per eating occasion). 
157 Information Nutrition of Package Form Food, 21 
C.F.R. § 101.2 (1993). 
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years of age when the article purports or is represented to be 
for consumption by an infant or child under four years of 
age."158 Nutrition labels must list specified information in 
a prescribed order: serving size, servings per container, 
total calories (determined by the Atwater method described in 
the USDA Handbook No. 74), calories from fat, calories from 
saturated fat (voluntary), total fat, saturated fat, 
polyunsaturated fat (voluntary), monounsaturated fat 
(voluntary), cholesterol, sodium, potassium (voluntary), total 
carbohydrates, dietary fiber, sugars, sugar alcohol 
(voluntary), other carbohydrates (voluntary), protein, and 
percentages of U.S. Recommended Daily Intakes (RDI) expressed 
as a percentage of daily value (DRV) of at least vitamin A, 
vitamin C, calcium, and iron based on a reference caloric 
intake of 2,000 calories.159 
The regulations standardize the presentation of 
nutritional information. It must be set off in a box and 
printed in one color on a white or neutral background. The 
box must display the identifying heading "Nutrition Facts" in 
large type, followed immediately by serving size, servings per 
container, and calories per serving. The box must contain two 
columns, one listing the nutrient and quantitative weight in 
grams or milligrams, and the other displaying the percentage 
of the daily value. A footnote must contain the statement: 




"Percent Daily Values are based on a 2,000 calorie diet. Your 
daily values may be higher or lower depending on your calorie 
needs."160 Nutrition information can appear "as purchased" 
and "as prepared" on the same item of food with slight 
modifications to the standard label.161 Simplified labels 
may suffice on food products containing insignificant amounts 
of seven or more of the required nutritional elements.162 
Sample labels (included in Appendix F) are provided in the 
regulations themselves, and the FDA strongly recommends 
graphic specifications, including different Helvetica typeface 
point sizes for different parts of the label and offsets for 
the box borders.163 
Several important lessons for the discussion of health 
plan report cards emerge from experience with the NLEA. The 
first and most encouraging lesson is that it appears that this 
type of information disclosure, supported by a public 
education campaign about healthy dietary habits, can raise 
consumer consciousness about the nutritional content of their 
foods. How consumers act on that information is less clear. 
In other words, we have little data about the ways in which 
consumer dietary habits are modified by the new information 
160 Id. § 101.9 (d) . 
161 Id. § 101.9 (e) (1993) . 
162 Id. § 101.9(f). 
163 Examples of Graphic Enhancements Used by the FDA, 
Appendix B to Part 101, 21 C.F.R. § 101, Appendix B (1993). 
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they possess. Whether Americans will eat better, now that 
many know what is in the food, is a major focus of public 
health research. 
Past experience with product warning labels and other 
educational campaigns gives cause for some caution before 
predicting success. In a widespread government education 
campaign in the early 1980s about seat belt use, people 
understood that seat belts reduced car accident fatalities, 
but actual seat belt use increased negligibly from 11.3% to 
13.9%.164 Consumers may respond to information in even more 
unpredictable ways. A California State law requiring cancer 
warning labels on certain products may have actually confused 
consumers into thinking that some products were more dangerous 
than they actually were.165 
The second lesson is that it seems clear that information 
disclosure about nutritional content is relevant only to a 
sub-population of consumers;166 the overall effect on 
164 Robert S. Adler and R. David Pittle, Cajolery or 
Command: Are Education Campaigns an Adequate Substitute for 
Regulation?, 1 Yale J. On Reg. 159, 176 (1984). 
165 See W. Kip Viscusi, Predicting the Effects of Food 
Cancer Risk Warnings on Consumers, 4 3 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 2 83 
(1988) (discussing the impact of California's Proposition 65) ; 
W. Kip Viscusi, Product-Risk Labeling: A Federal Responsibility 11-16, 
65-69 (1993) . 
166 One study of the effects of saccharin warning labels 
found that saccharin containing soft drink use declined in 
some populations, but remain unchanged in others, particularly 
the elderly. See Schucker, R.E., et al., The Impact of the 
Saccharin Warning Label on Sales of Diet Soft Drinks in 
Supermarkets, 2 J. Pub. Pol'y & Mktg. 46, 46-56 (1983). 
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population-wide dietary behavior is unclear. As commentators 
on the information overload controversy have noted, consumer 
motivation to engage in time-intensive searches varies. One 
can conclude that the NLEA has no impact on unmotivated 
consumers, except to the extent that food producers have 
improved the nutritional content of their products to avoid 
revealing embarrassing unhealthy attributes of their products. 
In this limited regard, the benchmarking inherent in the NLEA 
disclosure scheme promotes nutritional health, although via 
producers rather than informed consumers. Still, there 
clearly remains a significant market for less healthy foods, 
and information disclosure may simply have created a sub- 
market for "lite" and "reduced" foods in addition to other 
foods. 
The structure of the health care market may spread the 
benefits of quality searching more broadly than the food 
market does for nutritional information. The vigilance of 
some consumers who extensively research quality among plans 
may raise the quality boat for all. However, this conclusion 
is not automatic. If, for example, further research into 
consumer "point of insurance" decision-making confirms that 
price and waiting time for appointments overwhelm more subtle 
quality indicators, then low quality plans can still flourish 
as long as they meet the yardsticks that are important to 
consumers. 
The third lesson is that information disclosure 
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strategies like the NLEA are expensive. From the government's 
side, translation of the statutory provisions of the NLEA into 
FDA regulations was called one of the most "resource¬ 
intensive," meaning expensive, efforts in FDA history.167 
The costs to industry were even more significant. Compliance 
entails testing of food lots, altering package production 
lines, and cooperation with regulatory inspections. The 
government estimated the new labeling rules will cost industry 
$1.7 billion over twenty years. Industry leaders claimed that 
the first-year costs alone would exceed $2 billion.168 Most 
of these costs are naturally passed on to consumers. 
The final lesson is that an appreciation of the length 
and specificity of the statutory and regulatory scheme leads 
to the most significant lesson for the health care report 
cards. In crafting and implementing the NLEA, both Congress 
and the FDA could rely on the scientifically verifiable 
relevance of measurable data to good nutrition. We can 
measure what goes into food, and we know, at this stage in the 
development of nutritional science, that certain inputs like 
fat, protein, sodium, and vitamins have direct links to 
167 Fred R. Shank, The Nutrition Labeling and Education 
Act of 1990, 47 Food and Drug L.J. 247 (1992) (author is 
Director, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition of 
FDA) . 
Nancy Ryan & Linda M. Harrington, FDA Offers New 
Rules on Food Labels, Claims, Chi. Trib . , Nov. 7, 19 91, at C2. 

96 
nutritional outcomes.169 This knowledge is indeed a 
necessary first step, before we even consider how consumers 
will act upon that information. Part II described how 
dauntingly large that necessary first step is in health care 
quality measurement. 
D. Truth In Lending 
The story of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) is another 
instructive tale for the health care report card effort. 
Enacted in 1968 as Title 1 of the Consumer Credit Protection 
Act,170 TILA required all sources of consumer credit to 
disclose the annual percentage rate (APR) and the dollar 
finance charges for any credit transaction. Before the Act, 
lenders could quote interest rates in any non-deceptive 
format, and many in fact used different formulas to calculate 
rates. Since consumers could not compare different loans, 
Congress feared that people borrowed at rates that were higher 
than predicted for a competitive market for lending.171 The 
avowed purpose of TILA was to "assure a meaningful disclosure 
169 See Shank, supra note 167, 167, at 247-49 
(describing advancement of nutritional sciences in post-WWII 
era) . As far as our understanding of the relationship between 
nutrition and health has come, there is still room for 
improvement. For example, the FDA has not established RDVs 
for many trace mineral elements because we do not yet 
understand their importance. See Beales et al., supra note 
51, 169, at 525. 
170 15 U.S.C § 1601. 
171 See Sovern, supra note 123, at ? (citing Robert L. 
Jordan & William D. Warren, Disclosure of Finance Charges: A 
Rationale, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1285, 1293-94 (1966)). 
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of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare 
more readily the various credit terms available to him and 
avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the 
consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and 
credit card practices."172 
Congress anticipated that standardized disclosure of 
credit terms would substantially modify consumer behavior in 
two fundamental ways. First, standardization would encourage 
consumers to "credit shop" — comparison shop for credit based 
on the price of that credit. Credit shopping, in turn, would 
increase competition among credit sources to attract these 
well-informed consumers. Second, disclosure of the real costs 
of credit would encourage consumers to use credit wisely by 
opting for cheaper cash payments or by postponing overly 
expensive purchases.173 
Like the NLEA, but in marked contrast to the Health 
Security Act, TILA includes a fairly precise description of 
the information required in the disclosure. Section 1605 sets 
out an inclusive definition of the finance charge as "the sum 
of all charges, payable directly or indirectly by the person 
to whom the credit is extended, and imposed directly or 
indirectly by the creditor as an incident to the extension of 
172 15 U.S.C. §1601. 
173 See George S. Day & William K. Brandt, Consumer 
Research and the Evaluation of Information Disclosure 
Requirements: The Case of Truth In Lending, 1 J. Consumer Res. 
21, 21-32 (1974). 
' 
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credit." The finance charge includes the interest, time price 
differential, any amount payable under a point or discount 
charge, service or carrying charge, loan fee, finder's fee, 
and premium for default insurance.174 Although the Federal 
Reserve Board may prescribe methods of calculation, section 
1606 specifies that the annual percentage rate (APR) must 
yield: 
a sum equal to the amount of the finance charge 
when it is applied to the unpaid balances of the 
amount financed, calculated according to the 
actuarial method of allocating payments made on a 
debt between the amount financed and the amount of 
the finance charge, pursuant to which a payment is 
applied first to the accumulated finance charge and 
the balance is applied to the unpaid amount 
financed.175 
The statute establishes special rules for open-end 
consumer credit plans, such as credit card arrangements. 
Section 1602 defines an open-end credit plan as one under 
which "the creditor reasonably contemplates repeated 
transactions . . . and which provides for a finance charge 
which may be computed from time to time on the outstanding 
unpaid balance."176 The creditor must disclose the 
conditions under which a finance charge will be imposed, the 
174 15 U.S.C. §1605 (a) . 
175 15 U.S.C. § 1606(a) (1) (A) . Regulation Z describes 
the APR as "the measure of the cost of credit, expressed as a 
yearly rate, that relates the amount and timing of value 
received by the consumer to the amount and timing of payments 
made. Appendix J to Regulation Z provides equations for 
calculating the APR. Regulation Z, Determination of Annual 
Percentage Rate, 12 C.F.R. § 226.22 and app. J (1993). 
176 15 U.S.C. § 1602 (i) . 
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method of determining the balance upon which a finance charge 
will be imposed, the method of determining the finance charge 
itself, including a description of the nominal APR, a 
description of any other charges, and an explanation of 
security interests taken.177 
The statute also describes the content and format of 
information disclosure in closed-end and open-end credit card 
applications; the timing of this disclosure requirement more 
closely resembles the "point of service" information 
disclosure proposed for the health plan report cards. 
Solicitations to acquire open-end credit must include, in 
tabular format, the APR and specific disclosure if it is 
subject to a variable rate, annual or other fixed fees, the 
length of the grace period during which no finance charge is 
applied, and the name or explanation of the balance 
calculation method used to determine the balance upon which 
the finance charge is applied, the cash advance fee, late fee, 
and over-the-limit fee.178 Disclosure of terms for closed- 
end credit secured by a consumer's principal dwelling (home 
equity credit) requires even more extensive disclosure.179 
Initial reaction to TILA disclosures was mixed. The 
first area of debate concerned the quantity of information 
disclosed under the statute. Critics of the original Truth In 
177 15 U.S.C. § 1637. 
178 15 U.S.C. § 1637 (c) . 
179 15 U.S.C. § 1637a. 
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Lending Act charged that Truth-in-Lending disclosures 
overwhelmed consumers with too much complicated information, 
and ultimately discouraged them from credit shopping.180 
This argument embodied the concept information overload. In 
describing how disclosure under the old TILA had gotten "out 
of control", one author cites the lengthy and nearly 
incomprehensible disclosure of debt acceleration and default 
charges.181 Studies demonstrated that simplification of the 
disclosure terms increased understanding among consumers.182 
The Senate began to consider TILA reform in 1977. The 
Senate Banking Committee heard testimony from members of the 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors and expert opinion 
suggesting that existing TILA disclosure overwhelmed consumers 
by causing information overload. Information overload 
180 Jeffrey Davis, Protecting Consumers from 
Overdisclosure and Gobbiedygook: An Empirical Look at the 
Simplification of Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63 Va. L. Rev. 841, 
843-56 (1977) (using overload analysis to criticize TIL 
disclosures and arguing for simplification); Jonathan M. 
Landers & Ralph J. Rohner, A Functional Analysis of Truth In 
Lending, 26 UCLA L. Rev. 711, 721-34 (1979) (disclosure 
statement meaningless for average consumer); Jonathan M. 
Landers, Some Reflections on Truth in Lending, 1977 III. L.J. 
669, 677 (1977) (intricacies of statute and Regulation Z 
prevent consumers from knowing whether they have TIL claim in 
credit transaction disputes) ; Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Impact of 
Truth-In-Lending Disclosures on Consumer Market Behavior: A 
Critique of the Critics of Truth-In-Lending Law, 9 Okla. City 
U. L. Rev. 117, 128-132 (1984) (summarizing overload studies in 
TIL and noting that age, race, formal education, income, and 
credit experience correlate with overloading). 
181 Joseph K. Heselton et al. , Truth In Lending 
Disclosure in Open and Closed End Credit, 9 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 
17, 38 (1984) . 
182 See Davis, supra note 180, 180, at 869. 
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criticism eventually became a motivating force behind 
reform.183 Congress responded in 1980 by enacting the Truth 
In Lending Simplification and Reform Act (TILSRA), which 
eliminated some disclosures and simplified others.184 
Several changes made under TILSRA include reduced description 
of security interests,185 nondisclosure of several types of 
fixed fees,186 and elimination of the use of required 
terminology.187 
Congress gave the Federal Reserve Board authority to 
prescribe any regulations necessary to carry out the purposes 
of TILA; creditors and lessors were statutorily obligated to 
183 Simplify and Reform the Truth in Lending Act: 
Hearings on S. 3212, S. 1501, & S. 1653 Before the 
Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs of the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-12 
(1977) (statements of Philip C. Jackson on behalf of the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and testimony of 
Dr. Steven Permut of Yale University School of Organization 
and Management); Simplification of the Truth in Lending Act 
Oversight Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs 
of the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 369-70 (1978); Report of the Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, S. Rep. No. 96-73, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (concluding that TIL disclosure 
statements were ineffective communication devices because they 
were lengthy, legalistic, and disorganized). 
184 Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act of 
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 168, 168-85 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
185 Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §226.18(m) (1994). 
186 Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(b) (1993). 
187 Regulation Z contains only two terminology 
requirements: "finance charge" and "annual percentage rate." 
12 C.F.R. § 226.7(f) and (g) . 
■ 
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comply.188 The statute also required the Board to publish 
model disclosure forms and clauses for common 
transactions.189 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the 
enforcement agency for violations. 
Regulations promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board 
augment the specificity of the statutory provisions of TILA. 
The implementing regulation is commonly called Regulation 
Z.190 The most visible consumer-directed products of the 
TILA and TILSRA regulations are the "federal box" and the 
model forms. The federal box presents disclosure in a 
standardized format of limited terms that are presumably 
significant for the typical consumer shopping for a loan.191 
It must be set aside from other information so as to be in a 
"conspicuous and prominent location" through dividing lines or 
offsetting color backgrounds. The terms "annual percentage 
rate" and "finance charge" must be displayed more 
conspicuously than other terms.192 The box must also 
identify the creditor, the amount financed using plain English 
descriptions, the manner of computing the APR, any finance 
188 15 U.S.C. §1604. 
189 15 U.S.C. §§ 1607, 1631. 
190 Truth in Lending, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-226.30 and 
appendices (1994) . 
191 Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.17(a)(1), 226.18 
(1994) . 
192 15 U.S.C. § 1632 (1993); Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 
226.5(a) (1-2), 226.17 (1994); a model payment box is required 
by 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a) (1994). 
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charge with a description of some excluded charges, 
circumstances under which the APR may increase, limitations on 
that increase, an example of the effects of an increase, the 
number and timing of payments, total payments, any prepayment 
penalties, late payment charges, and security interests 
taken.193 
In order to prevent information overload within the box, 
only specifically required and directly related information 
may appear. Other terms may be provided in the body of the 
credit contract. For example, an itemization of the elements 
of the amount financed must be separate from the box.194 The 
Board provides model disclosure forms in the appendices to 
Regulation Z (see Appendix G for copies of model forms for 
credit card applications, home equity loans, and disclosure of 
terms in credit sales). 
Even though information overload played a prominent role 
in the discussions leading up to TILSRA, some argue that 
disclosure of credit terms remains confusing and too complex. 
One group of commentators connected to the Federal Reserve 
Board has noted that the disclosure regarding adjustable rate 
mortgages is too extensive and suggests that the lesson of 
193 The specific disclosures in the Federal Box and the 
different terms required in different types of credit 
transactions are covered in the extensive regulations of 
Regulation Z: closed-end credit 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.17-226.18 
(1994) ; credit and charge card applications 12 C.F.R. § 226.5a 
(1994); home equity plans 12 C.F.R. § 226.5b (1994). 
194 
(1994) . 
Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.17(a)(1)-226.18(c) 
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keeping things simple needs to be relearned.195 
The FTC was quick to declare TILA to be one of the most 
successful consumer protection statutes, citing increases in 
consumer awareness of the APR and increased market share held 
by low cost lenders.196 A Senate report in 1980 concluded 
that after ten years under TILA, "there is a heightened 
awareness among consumers as to the cost of borrowing from 
various types of lending institutions."197 In 1987, the 
Federal Reserve Board's Annual Percentage Rate Demonstration 
Project demonstrated that the dispersion of interest rates 
declined in markets in which "shopper's guides" listing APRs 
had been published.198 
Early research did find some improved knowledge of credit 
rates and charges, but evidence indicated that the majority of 
consumers remained uninformed or misunderstood the APR.199 
195 Griffith L. Garwood et al. , Consumer Disclosure in 
the 1990s, 9 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 777 (1993) (commenting on 
Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.5b(d)(12)(xi), 
226.19(b)(2)(viii) (1994)). 
196 F.T.C. Office of Policy Planning and Evaluation, Consumer 
Financial Services Policy Session 2 9 (1979) . One consumer survey 
found an increase in the awareness of typical credit rates 
from 14.5% to 54.5% for closed-end credit and 30.9% to 68.0% 
for open-end credit between 1969 and 1977. Thomas A. Durkin and 
Gregory E. Elliehausen, 1977 Consumer Credit Survey (Fed. Res. Bull. 
1978) . 
197 S. Rep. No. 96-73, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1979). 
198 Garwood et al. , supra note 195, at 781. 
199 Day & Brandt, supra note 158, at 31; Robert P. Shay & 
Milton W. Shober, Consumer Awareness of Annual Percentage Rates of Charge 
in Consumer Installment Credit: Before and After Truth In Lending Became 
Effective 11 (1973); Lewis Mandell, Consumer Perception of 
. 
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Improved knowledge varied significantly with past credit 
experience and economic status of the purchaser. More 
importantly, as was the case in nutrition labeling, the 
critical translation of heightened consumer awareness of the 
APR and other credit terms into modified credit purchasing 
behavior remained unclear. Several studies concluded that 
this heightened consumer awareness had little effect on credit 
search and credit purchasing behavior.200 One study found 
that the choice of a dealer or retailer assumed first 
priority, and the credit/cash decision flowed by default from 
this primary choice; it also noted that the timing of credit 
term disclosure usually occurred after the purchase decision 
had been made.201 
The Federal Reserve Board partly addressed this problem 
by requiring early disclosure, at the point of credit shopping 
Incurred Interest Rates: An Empirical Test of the Efficacy of 
the Truth-in-Lending Law, 26 J. Fin. 1143, 1153 (1971) 
(concluding that consumers were still largely unaware of rate 
of interest they were paying). 
200 Day & Brandt, supra note 173, at 30-31 (concluding 
that improved knowledge of the APR attributable to TILA "had 
relatively little effect on credit search and usage 
behavior"); George S. Day & William K. Brandt, A Study of Consumer 
Credit Decisions: Implications for Present and Prospective Legislation 96 
(1972) ("evidence strongly indicates that disclosure of annual 
percentage rates (APR) and finance charges did not sharply 
alter the credit buying behavior of California consumers"); 
George S. Day, Assessing the Effects of Information Disclosure 
Requirements, J. Mktg., Apr. 1976, at 42, 44 (reviewing studies 
of disclosure requirements and concluding that there is "much 
less than full awareness, and even less comprehension of the 
meaning of the information, while the behavior effects are 
usually negligible or nonexistent"). 




rather than at the point of purchase, for certain types of 
credit, such as credit cards, home equity lines of credit, and 
adjustable rate mortgages.202 
Like nutrition labeling, TILA disclosure also has varying 
relevance to different consumer populations. As noted above, 
past credit experience has a significant affect on knowledge 
about APR and finance costs. Some commentators argue that 
TILA disclosure is ineffective for the poor.203 
TILA disclosure also reenforces the fact that information 
strategies can be expensive. A survey conducted by the 
American Banking Association estimated the industry wide, 
direct, out-of-pocket compliance costs at over $10 billion in 
19 9 2.204 These costs are passed on to consumers in the form 
of higher fees, higher borrowing rates, and lower interest 
rates on deposits. 
Critics of TILA note an even more fundamental flaw. Even 
though APR disclosure is the centerpiece of TILA, comparison 
202 Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.19, 226.5a, 226.5b 
(1994). But see John P. Danforth, Who Pays for the High Cost 
of Excessive Bank Regulation?, 12 Banking Pol'y Rep. 1 (1993) 
(criticizing the up front disclosure requirements as ignoring 
the different rates and fees at which banks can profitably 
lend to different customers; concluding that earlier 
disclosure reduces credit opportunities for higher risk 
debtors). 
203 William C. Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure 
Regulation in Consumer Transactions, 1973 Wis. L. Rev. 400, 420- 
23; Homer Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit 
Reform, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 passim (1969) ; Eric Schnapper, Note, 
Consumer Legislation and the Poor, IS Yale L.J. 745, 749-54 
(1967). 
204 Danforth, supra note 202, 202, at 1-3. 
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shopping based on the APR is unhelpful in many common credit 
situations. For instance, dealer APRs in automobile financing 
do not reflect foregone cash payments from the manufacturer; 
APRs on open-end home equity lines of credit cannot be 
compared with closed-end second mortgages because the APRs are 
calculated differently.205 The true cost of open-end credit 
on credit cards bears less resemblance to the APR as fixed 
fees and annual membership charges have increased. In 
addition, one critic points out that the standard formulation 
of the APR is fundamentally misleading for mortgage borrowers 
because they are likely to pay off their loans on something 
other than the contractual loan repayment schedule.206 
E. Lessons from the NLEA and TILA for Report Card Systems: 
Acceptance of the working hypothesis that recent 
experience with consumer-directed technical information 
dissemination programs in consumer credit and food 
nutrition labeling supports the conclusions of hypotheses 
1-5. 
The analysis of the NLEA and TILA statutory disclosure 
schemes is important to the report card issue because it 
illustrates the difficulties of identifying and measuring 
relevant factors and determining whether disclosure has 
205 Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.14, 226.22 (1993); 
see Garwood et al., supra note 195. 
206 Danforth, supra note 202, 202, at 2-5. 
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achieved stated policy goals. First, the specificity of the 
NLEA and TILA statutes is in stark contrast to the lack of 
substance in the information disclosure requirements of the 
major health care reform plans. In nutrition labeling, 
Congress could identify fat, calorie, fiber, and salt content 
as important information to the decision to eat well. In 
TILA, Congress could define the APR and finance charges as 
(arguably) important elements of an informed credit 
transaction. Congress can do no such thing for health care 
quality, as Part II's discussion of the state of the art in 
quality measurement has shown. 
Even once that first step of disclosure is achieved, as 
it has been with much cost and effort for nutrition 
information and credit terms, critics argue, and the 
literature on cognitive biases and information overload 
suggest, that our understanding of how consumers respond to 
such disclosure is incomplete at best. Credit disclosures may 
not necessarily perfect credit markets and nutrition labeling 
by itself cannot improve our health. In the case of health 
care quality, Congress and a national quality agency cannot 
yet take that second step, because we simply do not yet know 
what kind of data imparts meaningful information on quality 
care. Once we do, we must still discover whether consumers 
will make point of insurance decisions that reward plans for 
meeting important, relevant, quality-based benchmarks before 




Conclusion: Acceptance of the Hypothesis that consumer- 
directed quality information dissemination, in the form of 
health care report cards, is practically, technically, and 
theoretically inappropriate as the foundation of quality 
assurance systems in health care reform; policy 
recommendations. 
Given the cognitive and state of the art limits on health 
care quality measurement, policymakers should consider several 
basic points regarding an information disclosure program in 
health care. First, disclosure alone will not be a quality 
assurance mechanism. Plans will strive to meet the 
but we do not yet have a set of 
benchmarks that completely represent the delivery of quality 
care. Consumers may make choices based on disclosed 
information, but it seems that quality information is not the 
most persuasive. If that is the case, a competitive market 
will not solve our quality problems for us. Second, the goals 
that report cards can realistically achieve, reinforcing a 
sense of consumer autonomy, facilitating consumer 
satisfaction, and promoting price shopping, can be fulfilled 
through a less extensive and less expensive program. 
The ultimate lessons for the health care context from 
case studies of nutrition labeling and truth in lending laws 
are twofold. First, quality information disclosure in health 
. 
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care is significantly more complex, and farther beyond our 
current abilities, than computing the APR or listing the 
percentage of calories from fat. Second, despite some success 
at elevating consumer awareness of nutritional content and 
credit costs, we still have only a vague understanding of how 
consumers process and act on the information provided.207 
Cognitive psychologists have shown that we should be cautious 
in drawing straightforward cause and effect relationships 
between disclosure and behavior that will reliably produce the 
goals of a statutory scheme. Our mental processes produce 
systematic biases and have demonstrated that information 
quantity, quality, and presentation affect decision-making. 
Clearly, the acceptance of this thesis' hypothesis shows 
that we have a long academic road to travel in creating a 
report card that will assure quality. We must recognize two 
stages in that journey: defining what information is relevant 
to our goal and understanding how consumers respond to what is 
disclosed. Experience with the NLEA and TILA demonstrates 
that the political and administrative process pays close 
attention to the first step, but social science suggests that 
we incompletely understand the second and that it receives far 
less attention from policymakers. In choosing what to 
disclose, we must begin to explore not only what types of 
,:i:' See generally Beales et al. , supra note 48 
(describing the general lag between our acceptance of the 
goals of disclosing information and our understanding of how 
consumers respond to what they are given). 
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information are meaningful to health care quality but also 
what information is meaningful to consumers. 
Policymakers must recognize that health care consumers 
will selectively over-emphasize, de-emphasize, or ignore 
different types of information. If report cards are to serve 
as quality assurance tools, these policymakers must also 
confirm that typically over-emphasized data are proven quality 
proxies. They must highlight typically de-emphasized data if 
that information truly reflects quality care. And they can 
conceivably reduce the costs of a disclosure program by 
eliminating ignored data from the report card, or reducing the 
quantity of disclosed data to focus attention on the proven 
quality proxies. 
We should view with caution the rise of a private report 
card industry in health care. The direct consequence of the 
prominence of the report cards in every national health care 
reform proposal has been a frantic rush amongst numerous 
private actors to assume the role of report card authority. 
With millions of dollars in public and private "grading" 
contracts at stake, the NCQA, JCAHO, managed care plans, and 
large corporations, to name just a few, have joined a high 
stakes race to produce the definitive report card. All 
certainly hope to rationalize quality measurement and 
management, and for all the financial risks and possible 
payoffs are staggering. 
If from this ferment emerges clear information about what 
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works and what doesn't on a report card, then so much the 
better. But during this frenzy to produce the definitive 
report card, policymakers, quality assurance experts, and 
consumers must carefully study what it is these systems 
measure, what relationship these measurements actually have to 
quality, how consumers process the data, and whether the 
processed quality data guide consumer choices in ways that 
reward quality care. That analysis must necessarily precede 
legislative validation or widespread public acceptance of any 
report card system as a quality assurance program. 
As a quality assurance program, report card systems 
currently deserve an F. The course of study in quality 
management proposed by policymakers and adopted by the private 
sector is at the graduate level, but as students, we are still 
in elementary school. This is not to say that data gathering 
and quality monitoring are unreasonable goals; they are at the 
heart of the preservation of what works in this health care 
system and the reform of what doesn't. But we do not yet know 
what to put on a report card, nor do we understand how the 
cognitive limitations and biases inherent in consumer 
information processing will shape quality-based decisions. 
The report card movement has emphasized quality as a 
profit engine for managed care companies, insurers, hospitals, 
and providers. But in truth, the ultimate goal of quality 
assurance is to improve the health of the nation rather than 
the corporation, to safeguard the body rather than the balance 
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sheet. Policymakers must keep that goal squarely in mind, 
lest they jeopardize the ends of quality assurance under 
pressure to use it as a financial means. 
This thesis suggests several themes for future health 
care policy regarding quality assurance systems and report 
cards. First, policymakers must encourage ongoing research 
into defining the components and outcomes of quality care. In 
an era of budget cuts and dwindling grant support, the public 
must demand that outcomes and process research continue. More 
importantly, quality assurance efforts — report cards and 
otherwise — must incorporate the results of that research into 
clinical practice. The PORT projects must be fully funded to 
their completion. With continued support, clinical practice 
guidelines can then serve as accessible distillations of 
accepted research into the outcomes of diagnostic and 
therapeutic strategies. 
The quality definition movement is already well under 
way; in order to preserve its momentum, policymakers must 
reward private efforts in its behalf and maintain direct 
public support through grants. The mechanisms to create 
incentives in the private sector — a more palatable and often 
less onerous alternative to public mandates — are numerous and 
varied. Legislatures could create tax incentives for private 
managed care companies to engage in quality definition 
research efforts; regulatory agencies could support favorable 
bond ratings for hospital networks that engage in outcomes and 
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process research; state governments could tie increased 
enrollment of Medicaid patients into managed care plans to 
requirements that those for-profit companies support or 
conduct quality definition research. 
This thesis proves that report cards cannot currently 
assure quality, in part because the relevant data has not yet 
been identified. The research also suggests that report 
cards, especially as they are currently conceived, may never 
assure quality, simply because satisficing decisions may 
marginalize quality-reflective data. Before policymakers 
condone report card systems, they must require the report card 
producers themselves to prove that consumers are using the 
quality data to choose hospitals, plans, and providers. HCFA, 
AHCPR, state agencies, and private accreditation agencies must 
support research into report card use, as well as into their 
creation. 
This thesis predicts a vacuum in health care quality 
assurance. By blindly accepting report cards, both the public 
and private sectors risk assigning quality assurance to a 
system that is ill equipped to fulfill that role. The need 
for active professionally led quality assurance programs that 
internally evaluate the process and outcomes of care within 
hospitals, networks, and managed care plans is paramount. 
Rather than betting the nation's health that satisfaction 
equals quality, policymakers must encourage the health care 
industry to enlist its professionals in quality assurance 
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review. To date, that requirement has taken the form of 
expanded quality assurance standards for accreditation and 
qualification for state funds. Until report cards prove 
themselves capable of quality assurance, the interim solution 
is to supplement these internal quality assurance programs 
with a requirement that they include process and outcomes 
measures. The integration of clinical practice guidelines 
into the quality assurance matrix would insure that national 
standards filter down to the individual departments and 
providers that actually deliver the care. By expanding the 
role of internal oversight to include quality promotion as 
well as identification of substandard care, providers can 
harness recent quality research to directly benefit patients. 
Policymakers should also reconsider the proper role of 
the government in the new report card industry. States 
agencies and other government actors should evaluate report 
card systems rather than produce them. The unexpected benefit 
of the rise of a private report card industry is that the 
government can step back and grade the report cards, rather 
than spend hundreds of millions of dollars in administering 
each test case. Pennsylvania, New York, Florida and other 
states should downsize and reorient their report card agencies 
to evaluate the report card systems emerging in the private 
sector. By investing limited resources in critical review, 
rather than in duplication of private sector efforts, the 
government can answer fundamental questions about report card 
■ 
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efficacy without prematurely investing itself in their 
success. 
Rather than mandating an expensive national program to 
collect and distribute data or blindly endorsing private 
sector report card systems as adequate quality assurance 
without first understanding what that disclosed information 
means or how it might be used, policymakers should initially 
invest a fraction of those resources into research efforts and 
critical review of the private report card systems currently 
flooding the new quality measurement market. By allowing 
employer networks and providers to experiment with different 
collection and disclosure formats in the course of these 
projects, we can learn what it is we want to measure, what 
those measurements tell us about quality of care, how, if at 
all, consumers and purchasers tend to react, and whether 
consumers' satisficing choices serve as a quality assurance 
mechanism. Some form of active quality assurance system 
incorporating well-designed outcomes-tracking — once we have 
identified the relevant measurable data — should independently 
monitor quality. By empowering federal or state agencies to 
monitor rather than produce the report card experiments, we 
can protect patients, providers, and the public treasury from 
the collateral damage that this thesis has shown to be the 
likely result of report card-based quality assurance.208 
The deputy administrator of the Health Care 
Financing Administration recently suggested that the 
government should establish a legal and regulatory structure 
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Most importantly, in order to preserve quality health care, 
policymakers must refrain from anointing the report cards as 
the foundation of quality assurance until there is evidence 
that they actually work in practice. The private sector and 
consumers should likewise recognize that report card systems 
are not proven quality assurance tools. Given the recent 
proliferation of report card systems, the data to answer these 
doubts will become available. We must simply resolve to study 
it. 
Treating an ailing health care system requires a cautious 
therapeutic approach. We should not yet expect too much from, 
nor spend too much on, information disclosure in health care. 
Strategic initial investment efforts to refine quality 
measurement, coupled with critical review by federal and state 
agencies of the report card projects themselves, must be 
followed by a comprehensive evaluation of the interface 
similar to that provided by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to oversee report card efforts. Consumers Should 
Look to Government for Information on Quality Measures, 
quoting Helen Smits, 3 HCPR 3 d20 (January 16, 1995) . At a 
minimum, HCFA has suggested filtering the report card data 
that plans produce through existing Peer Review Organizations 
created by Medicare legislation; the PROs, in turn, would 
present comparisons of the performance back to Medicare HMOs. 
HCFA Should Begin Pilot to Increase HMOs' Use of Patient 
Surveys 2 HCPR 35 d34 (August 29, 1994). 
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between consumers and disclosed information. This is the 
diagnostic test we must perform before we prescribe the market 
medicine of report cards as the treatment of choice in health 
care quality assurance. 

Appendix A 
Sample Kaiser Permanente Report Card 
Kaiser Permanente Northern 
Quality Report Card 


































U.S. Healthcare 1992 Quality Report Card 
HMO of Pennsylvania 
National Committee for Quality Assurance 
Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) 2.0 
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Appendix B 
Sample Health Status Questionnaire 
Source: Health Outcomes Institute Review (November 1993) 

Attachment 1 
Items in the Health Status Questionnaire 
Items Response Categories 
1. In general, would you say your health is: excellent, very good, good, fair, poor 
2. Compared to one year ago, how would you rate your 
health in general now? 
- much better now than one year ago 
- somewhat better now than one year ago 
- about the same 
• somewhat worse now than one year ago 
- much worse now than one year ago 
The following items are about activities you might do during 
a typical day. Does your health now limit you in these 
activities? If so, how much? 
3. Vigorous activities, such as running, lifting heavy 
objects, participating in strenuous sports 
4. Moderate activities, such as moving a table, pushing a 
vacuum cleaner, bowling, or playing golf 
5. Lifting or carrying groceries 
6. Climbing several flights of stairs 
7. Climbing one flight of stairs 
8. Bending, kneeling, or stooping 
9. Walking more than a mile 
10. Walking several blocks 
11. Walking one block 
12. Bathing or dressing yourself 
- yes, limited a lot 
- yes, limited a little 
- no, not limited at all 
During the past 4 weeks, have you had any of the following 
problems with your work or other daily activities as a result 
of your physical health? 
13. Cut down the amount of time you spent on work or 
other activities 
14. Accomplished less than you would like 
15. Were limited in the kind of work or other activities 
16. Had difficulty performing the work or other activities (for 
example, it took extra effort) 
- yes 
- no 
During the past 4 weeks, have you had any of the following 
problems with your work or other regular daily activities as a 
result of any emotional problems (such as feeling 
depressed or anxious)? 
- yes 
17. Cut down the amount of time you spent on work or 
other activities 
18. Accomplished less than you would like 
19. Didn’t do work or other activities as carefully as usual 
- no 
20. During the past 4 weeks, to what extent has your 
physical health or emotional problems interfered with 
your normal social activities with family, friends, 
neighbors, or groups? 
- not at all - quite a bit 





21. How much bodily pain have you had during the past 4 
weeks? 
- none - moderate 
- very mild - severe 
- mild - very severe 
22. During the past 4 weeks, how much did pain interfere 
with your normal work (including both work outside the 
home and housework)? 
- not at all - quite a bit 
- a little bit - extremely 
- moderately 
These questions are about how you feel and how things 
have been with you during the past 4 weeks. For each 
question, please indicate the one answer that comes closest 
to the way you have been feeling. 
How much of the time during the past 4 weeks... 
23. Did you feel full of pep? 
24. Have you been a very nervous person? 
25. Have you felt so down in the dumps nothing could cheer 
you up? 
26. Have you felt calm and peaceful? 
27. Did you have a lot of energy? 
28. Have you felt downhearted and blue? 
29. Did you feel worn out? 
30. Have you been a happy person? 
31. Did you feel tired? 
- all of the time 
- most of the time 
- a good bit of the time 
- some of the time 
- a little of the time 
- none of the time 
32. During the past 4 weeks, how much of the time has 
your physical health or emotional problems interfered 
with your social activities (like visiting with friends, close 
relatives, etc.)? 
- all of the time - a little of the time 
- most of the time - none of the time 
- some of the time 
How true or false is each of the following statements for 
you. 
33. 1 seem to get sick a little easier than other people 
34. 1 am as healthy as anybody 1 know 
35. 1 expect my health to get worse 
36. My health is excellent 
-defnitely true - mostly false 
- mostly true - definitely false 
don’t know 
37. In the past year, have you had 2 weeks or more during 
which you felt sad, blue, or depressed; or when you lost 
all interest or Pleasure in things that you usually cared 
about or enje. ,ed? 
• 
38. Have you had 2 years or more in your life when you felt 




39. Have you felt depressed or sad much of the time in the 
past year? 
Questions 1 through 36 adapted from the RAND 36-Item Health Status Survey 1.0 




Sample "Toward Excellence in Care" Quality Report 
Journal on Quality Improvement, Vol. 19, No. 11 (1993) 
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Your Hospital's Position for Fiscal Years 1989,1990, and 1991 
Figure 1. An example ofthe summary report accompanying the cholecystectomy report series for 10/01/88 through 10/01/91. This report provides the 
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Appendix D 
Hospital Effectiveness Report: DRG 127 
and excerpt from 
A Consumer's Guide to Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery 
Source: Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council 

DRG 127 

















during first week 














s c n s 







m O Q 




^istein Medical Center 427 2.3 70.7 22 26.40 28 34.62 8.4 16,025 
^ Hill Hospital 318 2.4 86.8 11 24.55 + 21 28.67 7.0 
9,314 
jjgji Hospital 149 2.4 60.4 5 9.37 11 13.68 8.2 11,743 
P Hospital of Philadelphia 400 2.4 80.3 20 26.80 36 35.20 8.9 19,949 
^Square Hospital 74 2.1 75.7 5 4.16 3 5.37 10.7 16.606 
Ejiwn Hospital & Medical Center 317 2.2 72.9 15 19.56 18 25.31 8.1 11,856 
ju Hospital 219 2.4 60.3 15 14.61 15 20.28 7.0 18.655 
temp University Hospital 217 2.1 63.6 10 10.24 11 15.69 6.9 13,333 
£it)f the University of PA 326 2.2 55.2 12 18.00 21 25.46 6.3 17,925 
pf Phil Col of Osteo Med 251 2.3 64.1 6 12.84 + 15 19.14 7.2 11,940 
C( A/Parkview 171 2.3 80.1 15 12.06 7 14.43 + 8.8 12,901 
Keedy Memorial Hospital 119 2.4 65.5 5 7.77 6 10.56 10.3 14,076 
esiospital / 351 2.5 90.9 19 31.51 + 48 34.18 — 8.6 11,844 
m Park Hospital 102 2.6 83.3 11 9.14 8 10.24 8.6 15,112 
^College Hospitals / Main 303 2.4 60.7 8 17.75 + 10 26.45 + 6.1 13,787 „, 
fatholic Medical Ctr/Miser 339 2.2 56.3 11 18.08 10 26.82 + 7.0 12,293 
^t Hospital 363 2.3 79.9 16 24.55 34 30.82 10.1 17,350 
Hospital 457 2.2 90.8 31 30.96 32 35.10 8.4 11,686 
Medical Center 178 2.1 70.8 9 9.39 1 12.42 + 8.2 13,700 
stem Hospital 282 2.3 81.6 13 18.37 18 23.14 9.3 14,384 
gpl Ratli 
fbo) 
fewer deaths or fewer patients who were medlcany unstable than hospitals In Comparative Database 
more deaths or more patients who were medically unstable than hospitals in Comparative Database 
single occurrence of a death or major morbidity In a DRG where death or major morbidity is very rare 
actual number of deaths or actual number of patients who were medically unstable are not statistically 




























during first week 












































































Pennsylvania Hospital 241 2.1 73.4 12 12.68 13 17.26 7.3 12,684 l 
Presbyterian Medical Center of Phil 407 2.1 64.9 23 21.23 29 29.03 7.5 10,947' C 
Roxborough Memorial Hospital 257 2.2 89.9 12 16.59 15 20.33 7.3 9,162 
c 
Saint Agnes Medical Center 410 2.2 78.8 24 26.27 27 33.24 9.2 13,585 
lr 
Temple University Hospital 294 2.3 48.3 8 14.65 24 22.99 7.5 16,394 r. 
Thomas Jefferson University Hosp / 259 2.5 72.6 13 19.75 38 24.55 — 9.0 20,016 
1r 







‘Average Admission Severity Score: 
The rating which measures how sick a patient is at the beginning of their 















Pennsylvania Hospitals Performing Cardiac Surgery § 
2-Year Comparison of Patients Treated, 
Statistical Rating for Number of Patients Who Died and Average Charge 
Hospitals q: 
listed alphabetically by 
geographic area' : " 
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WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA AREA 
Allegheny General Hospital 1,010 + $46,704 1,010 + $49,449 
Hamot Medical Center 444 A $34,769 498 A $42,201 
Mercy Hospital of Pittsburgh 682 A $39,002 725 A $41,340 
Presbyterian University Hospital /Pittsburgh 171 A $70,089 268 A $83,219 
Saint Francis Central Hospital 335 A $46,544 294 A $46,774 
Saint Francis Medical Center 463 - $48,808 463 A $50,185 
Saint Vincent Health Center 304 A $45,667 365 A $57,933 
Shadyside Hospital 714 A $56,015 915 + $62,842 
Western Pennsylvania Hospital 579 A $57,569 781 A $58,467 
CENTRAL & NORTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA AREA 
Altoona Hospital 332 + $27,333 403 A $31,054 
Geisinger Medical Center /Danville 323 A $30,202 393 A $34,294 
Harrisburg Hospital 467 - $39,587 458 A $47,833 
Lancaster General Hospital 673 A $24,307 680 A $25,219 
Mercy Hospital of Scranton 415 - $23,885 377 A $28,293 
Penn State University Hospital (Hershey) 201 A $33,282 195 A $36,753 
Polyclinic Medical Center 330 A $39,314 401 A $43,403 
Robert Packer Hospital 386 A $21,246 348 A $23,523 
Wilkes-Barre General Hospital /WVHCS 214 A $29,746 363 + $28,700 
York Hospital 335 - $26,334 339 A $30,113 
SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA AREA 
Albert Einstein Medical Center 581 A $61,971 615 A $71,051 
Bryn Mawr Hospital 300 A $49,309 323 A $58,329 
Episcopal Hospital 285 A $44,081 269 A $46,110 
Graduate Hospital 287 - $83,851 283 A $89,236 
Hahnemann University Hospital 847 + $65,825 885 A $73,500 
Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania 354 - $76,928 348 A $79,544 
Lankenau Hospital 584 A $48,261 594 A $52,262 
Lehigh Valley Hospital 920 - $39,186 903 A $44,619 
Medical College Hospitals /Main Clinical Campus 174 A $56,530 182 A $61,951 
Pennsylvania Hospital 90 A $51,164 157 A $58,785 
Presbyterian Medical Center of Philadelphia 478 A $42,408 562 A $45,850 
Reading Hospital and Medical Center 526 + $21,063 617 A $23,205 
Saint Luke’s Hospital of Bethlehem 337 A $33,245 427 A $34,415 
Temple University Hospital 258 A $65,303 253 A $72,171 
Thomas Jefferson University Hospital 292 A $52,464 329 A $61,974 
PENNSYLVANIA STATEWIDE 14,895 ^^v^%$44,649 16,2661|2^§5&$49.104 
§ Only hospitals reported lor both years are included in this table. 
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Southeastern Pennsylvania Area Hospitals 
Physician Practice Groups and Cardiac Surgeons 
for Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery 
Treatment Effectiveness Measure 
V- Hospital 'T;:. 
:; Physician Practice Group j ; 
'J-J; ■■ ,and .* * * ~,jt " _ 
,r;: . 4, /-Surgeons -. 
11 H <n 
a. 
T" Patients Who Died 
15 
"2 ® 
o S5 ai £ a " K OC 
Ui 
o CJJ “ c co z: 
<2 £E 
m 
GRADUATE HOSPITAL 283 11 3.4 -13.7 
Hendren, William G.t MD *. 63 1 -- 0.0 - 42 
. MacVaugh, Horace, III, MD m 21 m: Sj»Ttless than.30 patients treated - 
Plzak /Goldenberg / Woody 
;.*?1 Goldenberg, Marc R. 
Plzak;Louis F., Jr. i 











|| 0.6 - 3.3’ 
05 - 6.1 





:? Silverman," Edward M„ MD ^fless than 30 patients treated £>. 
HAHNEMANN UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 885 41 28.6 - 49.6 
Cardiac & Thoracic Surgeons, PC . -v' , w 











18.8 - 36.1 
; 0.9- 8.6 i 
V 1.6 - 6.1 
:gb.8"|8.8;; 











HOSPITAL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 348 22 10.0-23.4 








3.9 f 12.8 .if . 
ss than 30, patients treated 
Si* A * V 
fj yson,-George’ S.jUD ?Sg^less than 30 patjentstreatedM^' 
* This surgeon has privileges at another hospital and some of his/her patients are listed under that hospital. Refer to the physician listings 
to identify these hospitals. Check the Table of Contents for physician risting page numbers. 
Hospitals and Physicians may have commented on this report Copies are available upon request 





Sample Coronary Artery Bypass Graft 
Report Card 
Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (1991 
data) 

"HOW TO READ THE CHARTS" 
This chart is presented as a guide to help readers understand information in the charts. 
Please note that these are not actual data, but used for reference purposes only. 
Hospitals Performing Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery 
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: •) 5 
IS %n 
7 Hospitals With Fewer Number of Deaths Than Expected 
Hospital A 150 8 8.4 - 12.2 + $59,438 
8 Hospitals With Similar Number of Deaths as Expected 
Hospital G 276 9 6.2 - 9.2 A $39,946 
9 Hospitals With Greater Number of Deaths Than Expected 
Hospital M 508 31 18.6 - 28.1 - $44,789 
1 Name of hospital where surgery was performed. 
2. Actual number of patients treated at the hospital 
in 1991 for coronary bypass surgery. 
3. Actual number of patients admitted to the 
hospital for coronary bypass surgery, who died. 
4. The expected range of patient deaths at the 
hospital, taking into account the age, sex, and 
medical condition of that hospital's patients. 
5. Compares the actual number of patient deaths 
to the statistically expected number of patient 
deaths for that hospital: 
+ hospital had significantly fewer deaths 
than expected: 
A the hospital’s number of patient deaths 
was not significantly different than 
expected. 
6. The average amount billed for the stay in the 
hospital for coronary bypass surgery. 
7. Hospitals with significantly fewer deaths than 
expected (plus symbol) are grouped together in 
this table. 
8. Hospitals with similar numbers of deaths as 
expected (triangle symbol) are grouped together. 
9. Hospitals with greater number of deaths than 
expected (minus symbol) are grouped together. 




Hospitals Performing Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery 
Treatment Effectiveness & Average Charge 
• - : • * - -v* len^Who Died 
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Hospitals with Fewer Number ol Deaths than Expected 
Allegheny General Hospital 1,010 30 31.4-52.5 + $49,449 
Shadyside Hospital 915 24 242 - 44.3 + $62,842 
Wilkes-Barre Ge7feMW5l»iMQS^W^ ^ ’USS 1P+ $28,700 
Hospitals with Similar Number of Deaths as Expected 
Albert Einstein Medical Center 615 23 15.4-32.4 A $71,051 
Altoona Hospital 403 4 2.2 -12.7 A $31,054 
->f— - 
- - 







Episcopal Hospital 269 9 3.3 -14.1 A $46,110 
Geisinger Medical Center /Danville 393 15 7.3 - 20.3 A $34,294 
Graduate HospitalVv 283 • • ’-IlflT MMHH A $89,236 
Hahnemann University Hospital ) ’ 885 4V -- 4iA*5P*»A 
■ ■. 
2fit6 - 49.6 Vi.*: A $73,500 
Hamot Medical Center 498 24 11.7-26.1 A $42,201 
Harrisburg Hospital 458 22 8.6 - 22.1 A $47,833 
Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania 348 | A $79,544 
Lancaster General Hospital y 680 V 12 - ,)4lb>26.8- D A $25,219 
Lankenau Hospital 594 19 9.6 - 24.2 A $52,262 
Lehigh Valley Hospital 903 33 26.3 - 46.4 A $44,619 
Medical College Hospital /Main’Clinical Campus 
. • *iy. ■ *y. 
182 • :8 'F> • -iCll 92 7; ~y-* Si. A $61,951 
Mercy Hospital of Pittsburgh * .725 tMZM 15.8-33.7 I;A $41,340 
Mercy Hospital of Scranton 377 15 7.1 -19.6 A $28,293 
Penn State University Hospital (Hershey) 195 8 3.3 -12.5 A $36,753 
Pennsylvania Hospital 157 : Wj nmi7M P A $58,785 
Polyclinic Medical Center"' % ^- ■ 401 14> ^0Vi 5.9 A $43,403 
Presbyterian Medical Center of Philadelphia 562 22 11.5-26.7 A $45,850 
Presbyterian University Hospital /Pittsburgh 268 12 4.0 -14.8 A $83,219 
Reading Hospital and Medical Center 617 , 17 ' 8.8-23.4 A $23,205 
Robert Packer Hospital. . ’ ) ■%'; 348 ,8 4.8-16.1 - . - . -Jte— . _ ~.w-■ A $23,523 
Saint Francis Central Hospital 294 7 4.1 -14.5 A $46,774 
Saint Francis Medical Center 463 17 10.2-23.9 A $50,185 
Saint Luke’s Hospital of Bethlehem ’. 427 
’ . • 1* 
-.-■T8VI TJ, 21.5 F A $34,415 
Saint Vincent Health Center( 2 ... 365 Hill ■ A $57,933 
Temple University Hospital 253 10 3.3 -14.0 A $72,171 
Thomas Jefferson University Hospital 329 11 4.9 -16.3 A $61,974 
Western Pennsylvania Hospital - 781 .27 16.6-34.4 A $58,467 
York Hospital ? ' /FtfV 339 15 4.6-15.5 A $30,113 
Statewide Total 16,266 568 $49,104 
Hospitals and Physicians may have commented on this report. Copies are available upon request. 




Sample Nutrition Label 
Source: 21 C.F.R. Chapter I (April 1993) . 

21 CFR Ch. I (4-1-93 Ec 
Nutrition Facts 
Serving Size 1 cup (228g) 
Servings Per Container 2 
Amount Per Serving 
Calories 260 Calories from Fat 120 
% Daily Value* 
Total Fat 13g 20% 
Saturated Fat 5g 25% 
Cholesterol 30mg 10% 
Sodium 660mg 28% 
Total Carbohydrate 31 g 10% 
Dietary Fiber Og 0% 
Sugars 5g 
Protein 5g 
Vitamin A 4% Vitamin C 2% 
Calcium 15% Iron 4% 
* Percent Daily Values are based on a 2,000 
calorie diet. Your daily values may be higher 
or lower depending on your calorie needs: 
Calories: 2,000 2,500 
Total Fat Less than 
Sat Fat Less than 
Cholesterol Less than 









Calories per gram: 
Fat 9 • Carbohydrate 4 • Protein 4 
40 

1.9, Note 21 CFR Ch. I (4-1-93 
Nutrition Facts 
Serving Size Vi2cake (80g) 
Servings Per Container 12 
Amount Per Serving Mix Baked 
Calories 190 280 
Calories from Fat 45 140 
% Daity Value** 
Total Fat 5g* 8% 24% 
Saturated Fat 2g 10% 13% 
Cholesterol Omg 0% 23% 
Sodium 300mg 13% 13% 
Total 
Carbohydrate 34g 11% 11% 
Dietary Fiber Og 0% 0% 
Sugars 18g 
Protein 2g 
Vitamin A 0% 0% 
Vitamin C 0% 0% 
Calcium 6% 8% 
Iron 2% 4% 
'Amount in Mix 
" Percent Daily Values are based on a 2.000 
calorie diet. Your daily values may be higher 
or lower depending on your calorie needs: 
Calories: 2.000 2.500 
Total Fat Less than 65g 80g 
Sat Fat Less than 20g 25g 
Cholesterol Less than 300mg 300mg 
Sodium Less than 2.400mg 2.400mg 
Total Carbohydrate 300g 375g 
Dietary Fiber 25g 30g 
Calories per gram: 







Model Credit Term Disclosure Forms 




Ictcrve System Pt. 226, App. G 
3?' Home Equity Sample 
IMPORTANT TERMS 
of our 
HOME EQUITY UNE OF CREDIT 
contains important informat ion about our 
Lne of Credit- You should read it carefully 
t copy tor your records. 
monthly payments varying between $127.78 and $100.00 
Mowed by 60 monthly paymerts varying between $187.06 
and $118.08. 
of Terms: To obtain the terms deserted Fees and Charges: To open and maintain a line of 
ycu oust submit your application before January credit, you must pay the following fees to us: 
wms change (otherthan the annual percentage 
04 md you decide, as a result, not to enter into an 
- 0^x1 with us, you are entitled to a refund of any 
10 t>M you have paid to us or anyone else in connec- 
0 wtfi your application. 
fcoxty Merest: We will take a mortgage on your 
tr^m You could lose your home if you do not meet the 
gjijajora in your agreement with us. 
mei*~'T Actions: Under certain circumstances, we 
cm (1) terminate your fine, require you to pay us the 
were outstanding balance in one payment, and charge 
you certain fees; (2) refuse to make additional exten¬ 
sors of credit; and (3) reduce your credit Dmrt. 
* AppBcaUon fee: S1S0 (due at appBcailon) 
* Points: 1%of credit Bmtt (due when account opened) 
* Annual maintenance lee: $75 (due each year) 
You also must pay certain fees to third parties to open a 
Sne. These fees generally total between $500 and $900. 
If you ask, we will give you an itemization of the fees you 
will have to pay to third parties. 
Minimum Draw and Balance Requirements: The 
mininum credit advance you can receive is $500. You 
must maintain an outstanding balance of at least $100. 
Tax Deductibility: You should consult a tax advisor 
regarding the deducibility of interest and changes for the 
line. 
I you ask, we will give you more specific information 
concerning when we can take these actions. 
IMmum Payment Requirements: You can obtain 
stances of credit for 10 years (the ‘draw period"). 
Bring the draw period, payments will be due monthly. 
Toir mririum monthly payment will equal the greater of 
POO of 1/360th of the outstanding balance plus the 
bonce charges that have accrued on the outstanding 
hofu-U-JT. nance. 
Aler the draw period ends, you w3I no longer be able to 
ettari credit advances and mrst pay the outstanding 
Wance over 5 years (the "repayment period"). During 
•• repayment period, payments wB be due monthly. 
Tax minimum monthly payment will equal 1/60th of the 
Glance h^at was outstanding at the end of the draw 
Ponod pkrs the finance charges that have accrued on the 
remaining balance. 
JWmum Payment Example: If you made only the 
"renum monthly payments and took no other credit 
*lvances. it would take 15 years to pay off a credit 
•tonce of $10,000 at an ANNUAL PERCENTAGE 
"ATE of 12%. During that period, you would make 120 
Variable-Rate Information: The fine has a variable- 
rate feature, and the annual percentage rate (corre¬ 
sponding to the periodic rate) and the minimum payment 
can change as a result 
The annual percentage rate includes only interest and 
not other costs. 
The annual percentage rate is based on the value ol an 
index. The index is the monthly average prime rate 
charged by banks and is published in the Federal Re¬ 
serve Bulletin. To determine the annual percentage rate 
that will apply to your line, we add a margin to the value 
o( the index. 
Ask us lor the current Index value, margin and annual 
percentage rate. After you open a credit line, rate into(- 
mation will be provided on periodic statements that we 
wS send you. 
Rale Changes: The annual percentage rate can change 
each month. The maximum ANNUAL PERCENTAGE 
RATE that can apply is 18%. Except lor this 18% "cap." 
there is no Emit on the amount by which the rate can 
change during any one-year period. 
251 

Maximum Rate and Payment Examples: II you toad an 
outstanding balance of $10,000 during the draw period, 
the minimum monthly payment at the maximum AN¬ 
NUAL PERCENTAGE RATE of 18% would be $177.78. 
This annual percentage rale could be reached during the 
Tost month of the draw period. 
If you had an outstanding balance of 
beginning of the repaymer* period, the ; 
payment at the maximum ANNUAL Ps*^ 
RATE o(18% would be $316.67. This amr* 
rate could be reached during the first 
repaymert period. ; 
Historical Example: The toflowing table shows how the annual percentage rale and the minimimmortN»r 
lor a single $10,000 credl advance would have changed based on changes in the index over the put 15 nm.? 
index values are from September of each year. Whde only one payment amount per year is shown. paymw^T^ 
have varied during each year. 
The table assumes that no additional credit advances were taken, that only the rranimim payments werer_ 
month, and that the rale remained constant during each year. It does not necessarily indicate how the 
payments w9 change in the future. 




(%) <%) (%) W a.1 ojwyfrt 
1974 12.00 2 14.00 144.44 it 
1975 7.88 2 938 106.50 
1976 7.00 2 9.00 100.00 






1978 9.41 2 Draw Period 11.41 
1979 1230 2 1430 
1980 1233 2 14.23 
1981 20.08 2 18.00** 
1982 13.50 2 15.50 
1983 11.00 2 13.00 100.00 
1984 1297 2 14.97 20331 -ijzisgt 
1985 9.50 2 11.50 170.18 .i-apSa 
1986 7.50 2 Repayment Period 9.50 149.78 
1987 &70 2 10.70 14130 rmi<?9L 
1988 10.00 2 1200 130.55 ccgfstbT 
-—*3 
• This is a margin we have used recently. 
“ This rate reflects the 18% rate cap. 

I I. AJL\J, App. H 
H-1— Credit SaJe Model Form 

gtitrve Sy»t®m 
-o«tf sale ^P'0 
l#r 













The wfcm el cnei 
Total of 
Payments 
TKv wsmai row «*et! 
Toul Sale Price 
The to tar com #4 row ***• 
cpvm« on craOat. lAduOAf 
#.w 
v«v. row be*eif. Un man an oav-wm r /5oo- 
|4?4' M-WWO s 4)167.50 s74>o4-50 sqiaQ.20 
. , m, ,^ai to riant »t thri tun* an itamiration of lha Amount Financed. 
Q | y\ iitmiKtion. ^8CI Oo not want an itamitation. 
im* at.ntM unadufa will be: 
llwwn I Amount el tlimm I P»vm«ni| A/« 0-a# 
$3.11.23 lKor\tMij b^gmr\>r\g (p-l-^T 
Ox i.ic insurance sno credit disability insurance art not required to obtain credit, and will not be provided unless you sign 
ry« 1 e»rwaaa*w S^atur* 
i.m(crM.( ..I. ’Xrrrorr^vrr^n 
insurance. ^ 
OvCit 0'UOUiry 1 went credit disability 
insurance. So**™** 
Oedit Lilt and 
OfUDtiirv 
1 want credit lite and 
diubilitv insurance. S4*nw« 
You are giving a security intartft in: 
tbe goods being purchased. 
a ___ 
FEntfa^S ia.sp Won Hing mautinea S ______ 
Lata Charge: If a paymant it lata, you anil ba charged $10. 
Ftaoeymem: If you oay oft earty. you 
□ may □ anil not ham to pay a ptnalTy. 
SCnuy 0011111101 baantititd to a refund of part of tha finanoa charge. 
$aa your contract doctawenn for arty additional information about nonpaymant. default, any required repayment in full bo fort 
toe tcftaduled data, and prepay mam refund! and penaltiet. 
Iheoarectnodacopy of Out tutamanc 
JUluJ&wti £d=n 
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Unpublished theses submitted for the Master's and Doctor's degrees and 
deposited in the Medical Library are to be used only with due regard to the 
rights of the authors. Bibliographical references may be noted, but passages 
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